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Abstract. Selective opening (SO) security refers to adversaries that receive a number of ciphertexts
and, after having corrupted a subset of the senders (thus obtaining the plaintexts and the senders’
random coins), aim at breaking the security of remaining ciphertexts. So far, very few public-key
encryption schemes are known to provide simulation-based selective opening (SIM-SO-CCA2) security
under chosen-ciphertext attacks and most of them encrypt messages bit-wise. The only exceptions to
date rely on all-but-many lossy trapdoor functions (as introduced by Hofheinz; Eurocrypt’12) and the
Composite Residuosity assumption. In this paper, we describe the first all-but-many lossy trapdoor
function with security relying on the presumed hardness of the Learning-With-Errors problem (LWE)
with standard parameters. Our construction exploits homomorphic computations on lattice trapdoors
for lossy LWE matrices. By carefully embedding a lattice trapdoor in lossy public keys, we are able
to prove SIM-SO-CCA2 security under the LWE assumption. As a result of independent interest, we
describe a variant of our scheme whose multi-challenge CCA2 security tightly relates to the hardness
of LWE and the security of a pseudo-random function.
Keywords. LWE, lossy trapdoor functions, chosen-ciphertext security, selective-opening security, tight
security reductions.
1 Introduction
Lossy Trapdoor Functions. As introduced by Peikert and Waters [76], lossy tradpoor
functions (LTFs) are function families where injective functions – which can be inverted using
a trapdoor – are indistinguishable from lossy functions, where the image is much smaller
than the domain. The last decade, they received continuous attention (see, e.g., [45, 54, 57,
81, 4, 82]) and found many amazing applications in cryptography. These include black-box
realizations of cryptosystems with chosen-ciphertext (IND-CCA2) security [76], deterministic
public-key encryption in the standard model [22, 30, 78] and encryption schemes retaining
some security in the absence of reliable randomness [9, 11]. As another prominent application,
they enabled the design [12, 17] of encryption schemes secure against selective-opening (SO)
adversaries, thereby providing an elegant solution to a 10 year-old problem raised by Dwork
et al. [42].
When it comes to constructing CCA2-secure [77] encryption schemes, LTFs are often
combined with all-but-one trapdoor functions (ABO-LTFs) [76], which enable a variant of
the two-key simulation paradigm [73] in the security proof. In ABO-LTF families, each
function takes as arguments an input x and a tag t in such a way that the function fabo(t, ·)
is injective for any t, except a special tag t∗ for which fabo(t
∗, ·) behaves as a lossy function.
In the security proof of [76], the lossy tag t∗ is used to compute the challenge ciphertext,
whereas decryption queries are handled by inverting fabo(t, ·) for all injective tags t 6= t?. One
limitation of ABO-LTFs is the uniqueness of the lossy tag t? which must be determined at
key generation time. As such, ABO-LTFs are in fact insufficient to prove security in attack
models that inherently involve multiple challenge ciphertexts: examples include the key-
dependent message [18] and selective opening [12] settings, where multi-challenge security
does not reduce to single-challenge security via the usual hybrid argument [8].
To overcome the aforementioned shortcoming, Hofheinz [57] introduced all-but-many lossy
trapdoor functions (ABM-LTFs) which extend ABO-LTFs by allowing the security proof to
dynamically create arbitrarily many lossy tags using a trapdoor. Each tag t = (tc, ta) is
comprised of an auxiliary component ta and a core component tc so that, by generating tc
as a suitable function of ta, the reduction is able to assign a lossy (but random-looking) tag
to each challenge ciphertext while making sure that the adversary will be unable to create
lossy tags by itself in decryption queries. Using carefully designed ABM-LTFs and variants
thereof [58], Hofheinz gave several constructions [57, 58] of public-key encryption schemes in
scenarios involving multiple challenge ciphertexts.
Selective Opening Security. In the context of public-key encryption, selective opening
(SO) attacks take place in a scenario involving a receiver and N senders. Those encrypt pos-
sibly correlated messages (Msg1, . . . ,MsgN) under the receiver’s public key PK and, upon
receiving the ciphertexts (C1, . . . ,CN), the adversary decides to corrupt a subset of the
senders. Namely, by choosing I ⊂ [N ], it obtains the messages {Msgi}i∈I as well as the
random coins {ri}i∈I for which Ci = Encrypt(PK,Msgi, ri). Then, the adversary aims at
breaking the security of unopened ciphertexts {Ci}i∈[N ]\I . It is tempting to believe that
standard notions like semantic security carry over to such adversaries due to the indepen-
dence of random coins {ri}i∈[N ]. However, this is not true in general [33] as even the strong
standard notion of IND-CCA security [77] was shown [10, 63] not to guarantee anything un-
der selective openings. Proving SO security turns out to be a challenging task for two main
reasons. The first one is that the adversary must also obtain the random coins {ri}i∈I of
opened ciphertexts (and not only the underlying plaintexts) as reliably erasing them can be
very difficult in practice. Note that having the reduction guess the set I of corrupted senders
beforehand is not an option since it is only possible with negligible probability 1/
(
N
N/2
)
. The
second difficulty arises from the potential correlation between {Msgi}i∈I and {Msgi}i∈[N ]\I ,
which hinders the use of standard proof techniques and already makes selective opening se-
curity non-trivial to formalize.
Towards defining SO security, the indistinguishability-based (IND-SO) approach [12, 17]
demands that unopened plaintexts {Msgi}i∈[N ]\I be indistinguishable from independently re-
sampled ones {Msg′i}i∈[N ]\I conditionally on the adversary’s view. However, such definitions
are not fully satisfactory. Since {Msgi}i∈[N ] may be correlated, the resampling of {Msg′i}i∈[N ]\I
must be conditioned on {Msgi}i∈I to make the adversary’s task non-trivial. This implies that,
in the security experiment, the challenger can only be efficient for message distributions that
admit efficient conditional resampling, which is a much stronger restriction than efficient
samplability. Indeed, many natural message distributions (e.g., where some messages are
hard-to-invert functions of other messages) do not support efficient conditional resampling.
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Bellare et al. [17, 12] defined a stronger, simulation-based (SIM-SO) flavor of selective
opening security. This notion mandates that, whatever the adversary outputs after having
seen {Ci}i∈[N ] and {(Msgi, ri)}i∈I can be efficiently simulated from {Msgi}i∈I , without seeing
the ciphertexts nor the public key. Unlike its indistinguishability-based counterpart, SIM-SO
security does not imply any restriction on the message distributions. While clearly preferable,
it turns out to be significantly harder to achieve. Indeed, Böhl et al. [21] gave an example of
IND-SO-secure scheme that fails to achieve SIM-SO security.
On the positive side, simulation-based chosen-plaintext (SIM-SO-CPA) security was proved
attainable under standard number theoretic assumptions like Quadratic Residuosity [17],
Composite Residuosity [53] or the Decision Diffie-Hellman assumption [17, 62]. In the chosen-
ciphertext (SIM-SO-CCA) scenario, additionally handling decryption queries makes the
problem considerably harder: indeed, very few constructions achieve this security property
and most of them [44, 64, 66, 68] proceed by encrypting messages in a bit-by-bit manner. The
only exceptions [57, 46] to date rely on all-but-many lossy trapdoor functions and Paillier’s
Composite Residuosity assumption [74].
In this paper, we provide SIM-SO-CCA-secure realizations that encrypt many bits at
once under lattice assumptions. Our constructions proceed by homomorphically evaluating
a low-depth pseudorandom function (PRF) using the fully homomorphic encryption (FHE)
scheme of Gentry, Sahai and Waters [49].
1.1 Our Results
Our contribution is three-fold. We first provide an all-but-many lossy trapdoor function
based on the Learning-With-Errors (LWE) assumption [79]. We tightly relate the security of
our ABM-LTF to that of the underlying PRF and the hardness of the LWE problem.
As a second result, we use our ABM-LTF to pave the way towards public-key encryp-
tion schemes with tight (or, more precisely, almost tight in the terminology of [36]) chosen-
ciphertext security in the multi-challenge setting [8]. By “tight CCA security”, as in [61, 67,
59, 47, 60], we mean that the multiplicative gap between the adversary’s advantage and the
hardness assumption only depends on the security parameter and not on the number of chal-
lenge ciphertexts. The strength of the underlying LWE assumption depends on the specific
PRF used to instantiate our scheme. So far, known tightly secure lattice-based PRFs rely
on rather strong LWE assumptions with exponential modulus and inverse error rate [6], or
only handle polynomially-bounded adversaries [41] (and hence do not fully exploit the con-
jectured exponential hardness of LWE). However, any future realization of low-depth PRF
with tight security under standard LWE assumptions (i.e., with polynomial approximation
factor) could be plugged into our scheme so as to obtain tight CCA security under the same
assumption. Especially, if we had such a tightly secure PRF with an evaluation circuit in
NC1, our scheme would be instantiable with a polynomial-size modulus by translating the
evaluation circuit into a branching program via Barrington’s theorem [7] and exploiting the
asymmetric noise growth of the GSW FHE as in [31, 52].
As a third and main result, we modify our construction so as to prove it secure against
selective opening chosen-ciphertext attacks in the indistinguishability-based (i.e., IND-SO-
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CCA2) sense. By instantiating our system with a carefully chosen universal hash function,
we finally upgrade it from IND-SO-CCA2 to SIM-SO-CCA2 security. For this purpose, we
prove that the upgraded scheme is a lossy encryption scheme with efficient opening. As de-
fined by Bellare et al. [17, 12], a lossy encryption scheme is one where normal public keys
are indistinguishable from lossy keys, for which ciphertexts statistically hide the plaintext.
It was shown in [17, 12] that any lossy cryptosystem is in fact IND-SO-CPA-secure. More-
over, if a lossy ciphertext C can be efficiently opened to any desired plaintext Msg (i.e., by
finding plausible random coins r that explain C as an encryption of Msg) using the secret
key, the scheme also provides SIM-SO-CPA security. We show that our IND-SO-CCA-secure
construction has this property when we embed a lattice trapdoor [48, 69] in lossy secret keys.
This provides us with the first multi-bit LWE-based public-key cryptosystem with SIM-
SO-CCA security. So far, the only known method [68] to attain the same security notion
under quantum-resistant assumptions was to apply a generic construction where each bit of
plaintext requires a full key encapsulation (KEM) using a CCA2-secure KEM. In terms of
ciphertext size, our system avoids this overhead and can be instantiated with a polynomial-
size modulus as long as the underlying PRF can be evaluated in NC1. For example, the
Banerjee-Peikert PRF [5] – which relies on a much weaker LWE assumption than [6] as it
only requires on a slightly superpolynomial modulus – satisfies this condition when the input
of the PRF is hardwired into the circuit.
As a result of independent interest, we show that lattice trapdoors can also be used to
reach SIM-SO-CPA security in lossy encryption schemes built upon lossy trapdoor functions
based on DDH-like assumptions. This shows that techniques from lattice-based cryptogra-
phy can also come in handy to obtain simulation-based security from conventional number
theoretic assumptions.
1.2 Our Techniques
Our ABM-LTF construction relies on the observation – previously used in [13, 4] – that
the LWE function fLWE : Znq × Zm → Zmq : (x, e) → A · x + e is lossy. Indeed, under the
LWE assumption, the random matrix A ∈ Zm×nq can be replaced by a matrix of the form
A = B · C + F, for a random B ∈ Zm×`q such that ` < n and a small-norm F ∈ Zm×n,
without the adversary noticing. However, we depart from [13, 4] in several ways.
First, in lossy mode, we sample C uniformly in Z`×nq (rather than as a small-norm ma-
trix as in [13]) because, in order to achieve SIM-SO security, we need to generate C with
a trapdoor. Our application to SIM-SO security also requires to sample (x, e) from discrete
Gaussian distributions, rather than uniformly over an interval as in [13]. Second, we assume
that the noise e ∈ Zm is part of the input instead of using the Rounding technique4 [6] as
in the lossy function of Alwen et al. [4]. The reason is that, in our ABM-LTF, we apply the
LWE-based function (x, e) → At · x + e for tag-dependent matrices At and, if we were to
use the rounding technique, the lower parts of matrices At would have to be statistically
independent for different tags. Since we cannot guarantee this independence, we consider the
noise term e to be part of the input. In this case, we can prove that, for any lossy tag, the
4 The function of [4] maps x to fLWR(x) = b(p/q) ·A · xc, for some prime moduli p < q.
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vector x retains at least Ω(n log n) bits of min-entropy conditionally on At · x + e and this
holds even if {At}t are not statistically independent for distinct lossy tags t.
One difficulty is that our ABM-LTF only loses less than half of its input bits for lossy tags,
which prevents it from being correlation-secure in the sense of [80]. For this reason, our en-
cryption schemes cannot proceed exactly as in [76, 57] by simultaneously outputting an ABM-
LTF evaluation fABM(x, e) = At ·x + e and a lossy function evaluation fLTF(x, e) = A ·x + e
as this would leak (x, e). Fortunately, we can still build CCA2-secure systems by evaluating
fLTF(·) and fABM(·) for the same x and distinct noise vectors e0, e. In this case, we can prove
that the two functions are jointly lossy: conditionally on (fLTF(x, e0), fABM(x, e)), the input
x retains Ω(n log n) bits of entropy, which allows us to blind the message as Msg + h(x)
using a universal hash function h.
Our ABM-LTF extends the all-but-one trapdoor function of Alwen et al. [4] by homo-
morphically evaluating a pseudorandom function. Letting Ā ∈ Zm×nq be a lossy matrix and
G ∈ Zm×nq denote the gadget matrix of Micciancio and Peikert [69], the evaluation key of our
ABM-LTF contains Gentry-Sahai-Waters (GSW) encryptions Bi = Ri · Ā+K[i] ·G ∈ Zm×nq
of the bits K[i] of a PRF seed K ∈ {0, 1}λ, where Ri ∈ {−1, 1}m×m. Given a tag t = (tc, ta),
the evaluation algorithm computes a GSW encryption Bt = Rt · Ā + ht ·G ∈ Zm×nq of the
Hamming distance ht between tc and PRF(K, ta) before using At = [Ā
> | B>t ]> to evaluate
fABM(x, e) = At · x + e. In a lossy tag t = (PRF(K, ta), ta), we have ht = 0, so that the
matrix At = [Ā
> | (Rt · Ā)>]> induces a lossy function fABM(t, ·). At the same time, any
injective tag t = (tc, ta) satisfies tc 6= PRF(K, ta) and thus ht 6= 0, which allows inverting
fABM(x, e) = At · x + e using the public trapdoor [69] of the matrix G.
The pseudorandomness of the PRF ensures that: (i) Lossy tags are indistinguishable from
random tags; (ii) They are computationally hard to find without the seed K. In order to
prove both statements, we resort to the LWE assumption as the matrix Ā is not statistically
uniform over Zm×nq .
Our tightly IND-CCA2-secure public-key cryptosystem uses ciphertexts of the form
(fLTF(x, e0), fABM(x, e),Msg + h(x)), where ta is the verification key of the one-time sig-
nature. Instantiating this scheme with a polynomial-size modulus requires a tightly secure
PRF which is computable in NC1 when the input of the circuit is the key (rather than the
input of the PRF).5 To overcome this problem and as a result of independent interest, we
provide a tighter proof for the key-homomorphic PRF of Boneh et al. [25] (where the con-
crete security loss is made independent of the number of evaluation queries), which gives us
tight CCA2-security under a strong LWE assumption.
In our IND-SO-CCA2 system, an additional difficulty arises since we cannot use one-time
signatures to bind ciphertext components altogether. One alternative is to rely on the hybrid
encryption paradigm as in [28] by setting ta = fLTF(x, e0) and encrypting Msg using a CCA-
secure secret-key encryption scheme keyed by h(x). In a direct adaptation of this technique,
the chosen-ciphertext adversary can modify fABM(x, e) by re-randomizing the underlying e.
Our solution to this problem is to apply the encrypt-then-MAC approach and incorporate
5 Note that the same holds for the construction of [26], in which the PRF from [6] should be replaced by another
one which is in NC1 as a function the key (e.g., the one from [25]).
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fABM(x, e) into the inputs of the MAC so as to prevent the adversary from randomizing e.
Using the lossiness of fABM(·) and fLTF(·), we can indeed prove that the hybrid construction
provides IND-SO-CCA2 security.
In order to obtain SIM-SO-CCA2 security, we have to show that lossy ciphertexts can
be equivocated in the same way as a chameleon hash function. Indeed, the result of [12,
17] implies that any lossy encryption scheme with this property is simulation-secure and
the result carries over to the chosen-ciphertext setting. We show that ciphertexts can be
trapdoor-opened if we instantiate the scheme using a particular universal hash function
h : Zn → ZLq which maps x ∈ Zn to h(x) = HUH ·x ∈ ZLq , for a random matrix HUH ∈ ZL×nq .
In order to generate the evaluation keys ek′ and ek of fLTF and fABM, we use random ma-
trices BLTF ∈ Z2m×`q , CLTF ∈ Z`×nq , BABM ∈ Zm×`q , CABM ∈ Z`×nq as well as small-norm
FLTF ∈ Z2m×n, FABM ∈ Zm×n so as to set up lossy matrices ALTF = BLTF ·CLTF + FLTF and
AABM = BABM · CABM + FABM. The key idea is to run the trapdoor generation algorithm of
[69] to generate a statistically uniform C = [C>LTF | C>ABM | H>UH]> ∈ Z
(2`+L)×n
q together with
a trapdoor allowing to sample short integer vectors in any coset of the lattice Λ⊥(C). By
choosing the target vector t ∈ Z2`+Lq as a function of the desired message Msg1, the initial
message Msg0 and the initial random coins (x, e0, e), we can find a short x
′ ∈ Zn such that
C ·x′ = t mod q and subsequently define (e′0, e′) ∈ Z2m×Zm so that they explain the lossy
ciphertext as an encryption of Msg1 using the coins (x
′, e′0, e
′). Moreover, we prove that these
have the suitable distribution conditionally on the lossy ciphertext and Msg1.
1.3 Related Work
While selective opening security was first considered by Dwork et al. [42], the feasibility of
SOA-secure public-key encryption remained open until the work of Bellare, Hofheinz and
Yilek [12, 17]. They showed that IND-SO security can be generically achieved from any lossy
trapdoor function and, more efficiently, under the DDH assumption. They also achieved
SIM-SO-CPA security under the Quadratic Residuosity and DDH assumptions, but at the
expense of encrypting messages bitwise. In particular, they proved the SIM-SO security of the
Goldwasser-Micali system [50] and their result was extended to Paillier [53]. Hofheinz, Jager
and Rupp recently described space-efficient schemes under DDH-like assumption. Meanwhile,
the notion of SIM-SO-CPA security was realized in the identity-based setting by Bellare, Wa-
ters and Yilek [16]. Recently, Hoang et al. [56] investigated the feasibility of SO security using
imperfect randomness.
Selective opening security was considered for chosen-ciphertext adversaries in several
works [44, 64, 57, 66, 68]. Except constructions [57, 46] based on (variants of) the Composite
Residuosity assumption, all of them process messages in a bit-wise fashion, incurring an
expansion factor Ω(λ). In the random oracle model [14], much more efficient solutions are
possible. In particular, Heuer et al. [55] gave evidence that several practical schemes like
RSA-OAEP [15] are actually secure in the SIM-SO-CCA sense.
The exact security of public-key encryption in the multi-challenge, multi-user setting was
first taken into account by Bellare, Boldyreva and Micali [8] who proved that Cramer-Shoup
[37] was tightly secure in the number of users, but not w.r.t. the number Q of challenge
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ciphertexts. Using ABM-LTFs, Hofheinz managed to obtain tight multi-challenge security
[57] (i.e., without a security loss Ω(Q) between the advantages of the adversary and the
reduction) at the expense of non-standard, variable-size assumptions. Under simple DDH-
like assumptions, Hofheinz and Jager [61] gave the first feasibility results in groups with a
bilinear map. More efficient tight multi-challenge realizations were given in [67, 59, 47, 60]
but, for the time being, the only solutions that do not rely on bilinear maps are those of
[47, 60]. In particular, constructions from lattice assumptions have remained lacking so far.
By instantiating our scheme with a suitable PRF [6], we take the first step in this direction
(albeit under a strong LWE assumption with an exponential approximation factor). Paradox-
ically, while we can tightly reduce the security of the underlying PRF to the multi-challenge
security of our scheme, we do not know how to prove tight multi-user security.
A common feature between our security proofs and those of [67, 59, 47, 60] is that they
(implicitly) rely on the technique of the Naor-Reingold PRF [71]. However, while they gradu-
ally introduce random values in semi-functional spaces (which do not appear in our setting),
we exploit a different degree of freedom enabled by lattices, which is the homomorphic eval-
uation of low-depth PRFs.
The GSW FHE scheme [49] inspired homomorphic manipulations [24] of Micciancio-
Peikert trapdoors [69], which proved useful in the design of attribute-based encryption (ABE)
for circuits [24, 32] and fully homomorphic signatures [51]. In particular, the homomorphic
evaluation of PRF circuits was considered by Brakerski and Vaikuntanathan [32] to construct
an unbounded ABE system. Boyen and Li [26] used similar ideas to build tightly secure IBE
and signatures from lattice assumptions. Our constructions depart from [26] in that PRFs
are also used in the schemes, and not only in the security proofs. Another difference is that
[32, 26] only need PRFs with binary outputs, whereas our ABM-LTFs require a PRF with
an exponentially-large range in order to prevent the adversary from predicting its output
with noticeable probability.
We finally remark that merely applying the Canetti-Halevi-Katz paradigm [34] to the
Boyen-Li IBE [26] does not imply tight CCA2 security in the multi-challenge setting since
the proof of [26] is only tight for one identity: in a game with Q challenge ciphertexts, the
best known reduction would still lose a factor Q via the standard hybrid argument.
Concurrent Work. In a concurrent and independent paper, Boyen and Li [27] investi-
gated the construction of all-but-many lossy trapdoor functions from LWE and their appli-
cations to (selective-opening) CCA2 security.
2 Background
For any q ≥ 2, we let Zq denote the ring of integers with addition and multiplication modulo q.
We always set q as a prime integer. If x is a vector over R, then ‖x‖ denotes its Euclidean
norm. If M is a matrix over R, then ‖M‖ denotes its induced norm. We let σn(M) denote
the least singular value of M, where n is the rank of M. For a finite set S, we let U(S) denote
the uniform distribution over S. If X is a random variable over a countable domain, the min-
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entropy of X is defined as H∞(X) = minx(− log2 Pr[X = x]). If X and Y are distributions
over the same domain, then ∆(X, Y ) denotes their statistical distance.
2.1 Randomness Extraction
We first recall the Leftover Hash Lemma, as it was stated in [1].
Lemma 1 ([1]). Let H = {h : X → Y }h∈H be a family of universal hash functions, for
countable sets X, Y . For any random variable T taking values in X, we have
∆
(
(h, h(T )), (h, U(Y ))
)
≤ 1
2
·
√
2−H∞(T ) · |Y |.
More generally, let (Ti)i≤k be independent random variables with values in X, for some k > 0.
We have ∆
(
(h, (h(Ti))i≤k), (h, (U(Y ))
(i))i≤k))
)
≤ k
2
·
√
2−H∞(T ) · |Y |.
A consequence of Lemma 1 was used by Agrawal et al. [1] to re-randomize matrices over Zq
by multiplying them with small-norm matrices.
Lemma 2 ([1]). Let us assume that m > 2n · log q, for some prime q > 2. For any integer
k ∈ poly(n), if A ←↩ U(Zm×nq ), B ←↩ U(Zk×nq ), R ←↩ U({−1, 1}k×m), the distributions
(A,R ·A) and (A,B) are within 2−Ω(n) statistical distance.
2.2 Reminders on Lattices
Let Σ ∈ Rn×n be a symmetric definite positive matrix, and c ∈ Rn. We define the Gaussian
function on Rn by ρΣ,c(x) = exp(−π(x − c)>Σ−1(x − c)) and if Σ = σ2 · In and c = 0
we denote it by ρσ. For an n-dimensional lattice Λ, we define ηε(Λ) as the smallest r > 0
such that ρ1/r(Λ̂ \ 0) ≤ ε with Λ̂ denoting the dual of Λ, for any ε ∈ (0, 1). In particular,
we have η2−n(Zn) ≤ O(
√
n). We denote by λ∞1 (Λ) the infinity norm of the shortest non-zero
vector of Λ.
For a matrix A ∈ Zm×nq , we define Λ⊥(A) = {x ∈ Zm : x> · A = 0 mod q} and
Λ(A) = A · Zn + qZm.
Lemma 3 (Adapted from [48, Lemma 5.3]). Let m ≥ 2n and q ≥ 2 prime. With
probability ≥ 1 − 2−Ω(n), we have η2−n(Λ⊥(A)) ≤ η2−m(Λ⊥(A)) ≤ O(
√
m) · qn/m and
λ∞1 (Λ(A)) ≥ q1−n/m/4.
Let Λ be a full-rank n-dimensional lattice, Σ ∈ Rn×n be a symmetric definite positive
matrix, and x′, c ∈ Rn. We define the discrete Gaussian distribution of support Λ + x′
and parameters Σ and c by DΛ+x′,Σ,c(x) ∼ ρΣ,c(x), for every x ∈ Λ + x′. For a subset
S ⊆ Λ+ x′, we denote by DSΛ+x′,Σ,c the distribution obtained by restricting the distribution
DΛ+x′,Σ,c to the support S. For x ∈ S, we have DSΛ+x′,Σ,c(x) = DΛ+x′,Σ,c(x)/pa, where
pa(S) = DΛ+x′,Σ,c(S). Assuming that 1/pa(S) = n
O(1), membership in S is efficiently testable
and DΛ+x′,Σ,c is efficiently samplable, the distribution D
S
Λ+x′,Σ,c can be efficiently sampled
from using rejection sampling.
We will use the following standard results on lattice Gaussians.
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Lemma 4 (Adapted from [29, Lemma 2.3]). There exists a ppt algorithm that, given
a basis (bi)i≤n of a full-rank lattice Λ, x
′, c ∈ Rn and Σ ∈ Rn×n symmetric definite positive
such that Ω(
√
log n) ·maxi ‖Σ−1/2 · bi‖ ≤ 1, returns a sample from DΛ+x′,Σ,c.
Lemma 5 (Adapted from [70, Lemma 4.4]). For any n-dimensional lattice Λ, x′, c ∈
Rn and symmetric positive definite Σ ∈ Rn×n satisfying σn(
√
Σ) ≥ η2−n(Λ), we have
Prx←↩DΛ+x′,Σ,c [‖x− c‖ ≥
√
n · ‖
√
Σ‖] ≤ 2−n+2.
Lemma 6 (Adapted from [70, Lemma 4.4]). For any n-dimensional lattice Λ, x′, c ∈ Rn
and symmetric positive definite Σ ∈ Rn×n satisfying σn(
√
Σ) ≥ η2−n(Λ), we have
ρΣ,c(Λ+ x
′) ∈ [1− 2−n, 1 + 2−n] · det(Σ)1/2/det(Λ).
We will also use the following result on the singular values of discrete Gaussian random
matrices.
Lemma 7 ([2, Lemma 8]). Assume that m ≥ 2n. Let F ∈ Zm×n with each entry sampled
from DZ,σ, for some σ ≥ Ω(
√
n). Then with probability ≥ 1−2−Ω(n), we have ‖F‖ ≤ O(
√
mσ)
and σn(F) ≥ Ω(
√
mσ).
2.3 The Learning With Errors Problem
We recall the Learning With Errors problem [79]. Note that we make the number of sam-
ples m explicit in our definition.
Definition 1. Let λ ∈ N be a security parameter and let integers n = n(λ), m = m(λ),
q = q(λ). Let χ = χ(λ) be an efficiently samplable distribution over Zq. The LWEn,m,q,χ
assumption posits that the following distance is a negligible function for any ppt algorithm A:
AdvA,LWEn,m,q,χ(λ) :=
∣∣Pr[A(1λ,A,u) = 1 | A←↩ U(Zn×mq ),u←↩ U(Zmq )]
− Pr[A(1λ,A,A · s + e) = 1 | A←↩ U(Zm×nq ), s←↩ U(Znq ), e←↩ χm]
∣∣.
A typical choice for χ is the integer Gaussian distribution DZ,α·q for some parameter α ∈
(
√
n/q, 1). In particular, in this case, there exist reductions from standard lattice problems
to LWE (see [79, 29]).
In [69], Micciancio and Peikert described a trapdoor mechanism for LWE. Their technique
uses a “gadget” matrix G ∈ Zm×nq for which anyone can publicly sample short vectors x ∈ Zm
such that x>G = 0. As in [69], we call R ∈ Zm×m a G-trapdoor for a matrix A ∈ Z2m×nq if
[R | Im] ·A = G ·H for some invertible matrix H ∈ Zn×nq which is referred to as the trapdoor
tag. If H = 0, then R is called a “punctured” trapdoor for A.
Lemma 8 ([69, Section 5]). Assume that m ≥ 2n log q. There exists a ppt algorithm
GenTrap that takes as inputs matrices Ā ∈ Zm×nq , H ∈ Zn×nq and outputs matrices R ∈
{−1, 1}m×m and
A =
[
Ā
−RĀ + GH
]
∈ Z2m×nq
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such that if H ∈ Zn×nq is invertible, then R is a G-trapdoor for A with tag H; and if H = 0,
then R is a punctured trapdoor.
Further, in case of a G-trapdoor, one can efficiently compute from A,R and H a ba-
sis (bi)i≤2m of Λ
⊥(A) such that maxi ‖bi‖ ≤ O(m3/2).
Micciancio and Peikert also showed that a G-trapdoor for A ∈ Z2m×nq can be used to
invert the LWE function (s, e) 7→ A·s+e, for any s ∈ Znq and any sufficiently short e ∈ Z2m.
Lemma 9 ([69, Theorem 5.4]). There exists a deterministic polynomial time algorithm
Invert that takes as inputs matrices R ∈ Zm×m, A ∈ Z2m×nq , H ∈ Zn×nq such that R is a G-
trapdoor for A with invertible tag H, and a vector A·s+e with s ∈ Znq and ‖e‖ ≤ q/(10·‖R‖),
and outputs s and e.
As showed in [49, 24], homomorphic computations can be performed on G-trapdoors
with respect to trapdoor tags Hi corresponding to scalars. As observed in [31], when the
circuit belongs to NC1, it is advantageous to convert the circuit into a branching program,
using Barrington’s theorem. This is interesting to allow for a polynomial modulus q but
imposes a circuit depth restriction (so that the evaluation algorithms are guaranteed to run
in polynomial-time).
Lemma 10 (Adapted from [49, 24]). Let C : {0, 1}κ → {0, 1} be a NAND Boolean
circuit of depth d. Let Bi = Ri · Ā + xi ·G ∈ Zm×nq with Ā ∈ Zm×nq , Ri ∈ {−1, 1}m×m and
xi ∈ {0, 1}, for i ≤ κ.
• There exist deterministic algorithms EvalpubCCT and Eval
priv
CCT that satisfy:
EvalpubCCT(C, (Bi)i) = Eval
priv
CCT(C, (Ri)i) · Ā + C(x1, . . . , xκ) ·G,
and ‖EvalprivCCT(C, (Ri)i)‖ ≤ mO(d). These algorithms run in time poly(|C|, κ,m, n, log q)
• There exist deterministic algorithms EvalpubBP and Eval
priv
BP that satisfy:
EvalpubBP (C, (Bi)i) = Eval
priv
BP (C, (Ri)i) · Ā + C(x1, . . . , xκ) ·G,
and ‖EvalprivBP (C, (Ri)i)‖ ≤ 4d·O(m3/2). These algorithms run in time poly(4d, κ,m, n, log q).
Note that we impose that the Evalpub and Evalpriv algorithms are deterministic, although
probabilistic variants are considered in the literature. This is important in our case, as it
will be used in the function evaluation algorithm of our all-but-many lossy trapdoor function
family LTF function evaluation.
2.4 Lossy Trapdoor Functions
We consider a variant of the notion of Lossy Trapdoor Functions (LTF) introduced by [76],
for which the function input may be sampled from a distribution that differs from the uni-
form distribution. In our constructions, for lossiness security, we actually allow the function
evaluation algorithm to sample from a larger domain DomEλ than the domain Dom
D
λ on which
the inversion algorithm guaranteed to succeed. A sample over DomEλ has an overwhelming
probability to land in DomDλ with respect to the sampling distribution.
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Definition 2. For an integer l(λ) > 0, a family of l-lossy trapdoor functions LTF with
security parameter λ, evaluation sampling domain DomEλ , efficiently samplable distribution
DDomEλ on Dom
E
λ , inversion domain Dom
D
λ ⊆ DomEλ and range Rngλ is a tuple of ppt algo-
rithms (IGen, LGen,Eval, Invert) with the following functionalities:
Injective key generation. LTF.IGen(1λ) outputs an evaluation key ek for an injective func-
tion together with an inversion key ik.
Lossy key generation. LTF.LGen(1λ) outputs an evaluation key ek for a lossy function.
In this case, there is no inversion key and we define ik = ⊥.
Evaluation. LTF.Eval(ek,X) takes as inputs the evaluation key ek and a function input
X ∈ DomEλ . It outputs an image Y = fek(X).
Inversion. LTF.Invert(ik, Y ) inputs the inversion key ik 6= ⊥ and a Y ∈ Rngλ. It outputs
the unique X = f−1ik (Y ) such that Y = fek(X) (if it exists).
In addition, LTF has to meet the following requirements:
Inversion Correctness. For an injective key pair (ek, ik)← LTF.IGen(1λ), we have, except
with negligible probability over (ek, ik), that for all inputs X ∈ DomDλ , X = f−1ik (fek(X)).
Eval Sampling Correctness. For X sampled from DDomEλ , we have X ∈ Dom
D
λ except
with negligible probability.
l-Lossiness. For (ek,⊥)←↩ LTF.LGen(1λ) and X ←↩ DDomEλ , we have
H∞(X | ek = ek, fek(X) = y) ≥ l,
for all (ek, y) except a set of negligible probability.
Indistinguishability. The distribution of lossy functions is computationally indistinguish-
able from that of injective functions, namely:
AdvA,LTF(λ) :=
∣∣Pr[A(1λ, ek) = 1 | (ek, ik)←↩ LTF.IGen(1λ)]
− Pr[A(1λ, ek) = 1 | (ek,⊥)←↩ LTF.LGen(1λ)]
∣∣
is a negligible function for any ppt algorithm A.
2.5 All-But-Many Lossy Trapdoor Functions
We consider a variant of the definition of All-But-Many Lossy Trapdoor Functions (ABM-
LTF) from [57], in which the distribution over the domain may not be the uniform one.
Definition 3. For an integer l(λ) > 0, a family of all-but-many l- lossy trapdoor functions
ABM with security parameter λ, evaluation sampling domain DomEλ , efficiently samplable
distribution DDomEλ on Dom
E
λ , inversion domain Dom
D
λ ⊆ DomEλ , and range Rngλ consists of
the following ppt algorithms:
Key generation. ABM.Gen(1λ) outputs an evaluation key ek, an inversion key ik and a
tag key tk. The evaluation key ek defines a set T = Tc × Ta containing the disjoint sets
of lossy tags Tloss and injective tags Tinj. Each tag t = (tc, ta) is described by a core part
tc ∈ Tc and an auxiliary part ta ∈ Ta.
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Evaluation. ABM.Eval(ek, t,X) takes as inputs an evaluation key ek, a tag t ∈ T and a
function input X ∈ DomEλ . It outputs an image Y = fek,t(X).
Inversion. ABM.Invert(ik, t, Y ) takes as inputs an inversion key ik, a tag t ∈ T and a
Y ∈ Rngλ. It outputs the unique X = f−1ik,t(Y ) such that Y = fek,t(X).
Lossy tag generation. ABM.LTag(tk, ta) takes as input an auxiliary part ta ∈ Ta and out-
puts a core part tc such that t = (tc, ta) forms a lossy tag.
In addition, ABM has to meet the following requirements:
Inversion Correctness. For (ek, ik, tk) produced by ABM.Gen(1λ), we have, except with
negligible probability over (ek, ik, tk), that for all injective tags t ∈ Tinj and all inputs
X ∈ DomDλ , that X = f−1ik,t(fek,t(X)).
Eval Sampling Correctness. For X sampled from DDomEλ , we have X ∈ Dom
D
λ except
with negligible probability.
Lossiness. For (ek, ik, tk)←↩ ABM.Gen(1λ), any ta ∈ Ta, tc ←↩ ABM.LTag(tk, ta) and X ←↩
DDomEλ , we have that H∞(X | ek = ek, fek,(tc,ta)(X) = y) ≥ l, for all (ek, y) except a set
of negligible probability.
Indistinguishability. Multiple lossy tags are computationally indistinguishable from ran-
dom tags, namely:
AdvA,indQ (λ) :=
∣∣Pr[A(1λ, ek)ABM.LTag(tk,·) = 1]− Pr[A(1λ, ek)OTc (·) = 1]∣∣
is negligible for any ppt algorithm A, where (ek, ik, tk)←↩ ABM.Gen(1λ) and OTc(·) is an
oracle that assigns a random core tag tc ←↩ U(Tc) to each auxiliary tag ta ∈ Ta (rather
than a core tag that makes t = (tc, ta) lossy). Here Q denotes the number of oracle queries
made by A.
Evasiveness. Non-injective tags are computationally hard to find, even with access to an
oracle outputting multiple lossy tags, namely:
AdvA,evaQ1,Q2(λ) := Pr[A(1
λ, ek)ABM.LTag(tk,·),ABM.IsLossy(tk,·) ∈ T \Tinj]
is negligible for legitimate adversary A, where (ek, ik, tk)←↩ ABM.Gen(1λ) and A is given
access to the following oracles:
- ABM.LTag(tk, ·) which acts exactly as the lossy tag generation algorithm.
- ABM.IsLossy(tk, ·) that takes as input a tag t = (tc, ta) and outputs 1 if t ∈ T \Tinj and
otherwise outputs 0.
We denote by Q1 and Q2 the number of queries to these two oracles. By “legitimate
adversary”, we mean that A is ppt and never outputs a tag t = (tc, ta) such that tc was
obtained by invoking the ABM.LTag oracle on ta.
As pointed out in [57], the evasiveness property mirrors the notion of strong unforgeability
for signature schemes. Indeed, the adversary is considered successful even if it outputs a
(tc, ta) such that ta was submitted to ABM.LTag(tk, ·) as long as the response t′a of the latter
was such that t′a 6= ta.
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In order to simplify the tight proof of our public-key encryption scheme, we slightly
modified the original definition of evasiveness in [57] by introducing a lossiness-testing oracle
ABM.IsLossy(tk, ·). When it comes to proving tight CCA security, it will save the reduction
from having to guess which decryption query contradicts the evasiveness property of the
underlying ABM-LTF.
2.6 Selective-Opening Chosen-Ciphertext Security
A public-key encryption scheme consists of a tuple (Par-Gen,Keygen,Encrypt,Decrypt) of ppt
algorithms, where Par-Gen takes as input a security parameter 1λ and generates common
public parameters Γ , Keygen takes in Γ and outputs a key pair (SK,PK), while Encrypt
and Decrypt proceed in the usual way.
As a first step, we will consider encryption schemes that provide SO security in the sense
of an indistinguishability-based definition (or IND-SOA security). This notion is captured
by a game where the adversary obtains N(λ) ciphertexts, opens an arbitrary subset of
these (meaning that it obtains both the plaintexts and the encryption coins) and asks that
remaining ciphertexts be indistinguishable from messages that are independently re-sampled
conditionally on opened ones. In the IND-SO-CCA2 scenario, this should remain true even
if the adversary has a decryption oracle. A formal definition is recalled in Appendix B.3.
A stronger notion is that of simulation-based security, which demands that an efficient
simulator be able to perform about as well as the adversary without seeing neither the cipher-
texts nor the public key. Formally, two experiments are required to have indistinguishable
output distributions.
In the real experiment, the challenger samples Msg = (Msg1, . . . ,MsgN)←M from the
joint message distribution and picks random coins r1, . . . , rN ← R to compute ciphertexts
{Ci ← Encrypt(PK,Msgi, ri)}i∈[N ] which are given to the adversary A. The latter responds
by choosing a subset I ⊂ [N ] and gets back {(Msgi, ri)}i∈I . The adversary A outputs a string
outA and the output of the experiment is a predicate R(M,Msg, outA).
In the ideal experiment, the challenger samples Msg = (Msg1, . . . ,MsgN)←M from the
joint message distribution. Without seeing any encryptions, the simulator chooses a subset
I and some state information st. After having seen the messages {Msgi}i∈I and the state
information but without seeing any randomness, the simulator outputs a string outS. The
outcome of the ideal experiment is the predicate R(M,Msg, outS). As in [44, 62], we al-
low the adversary to choose the message distribution M. While this distribution should be
efficiently samplable, it is not required to support efficient conditional re-sampling.
Definition 4 ([44, 62]). A public-key encryption scheme (Par-Gen,Keygen,Encrypt,Decrypt)
provides simulation-based selective opening (SIM-SO-CPA) security if, for any ppt
function R and any ppt adversary A = (A0,A1,A2) in the real experiment Expcpa-so-real(λ),
there is an efficient simulator S = (S0, S1, S2) in the ideal experiment Exp
so-ideal(λ) s.t.
|Pr[Expcpa-so-real(λ) = 1]− Pr[Expso-ideal(λ) = 1]|
is negligible, where the two experiments are defined as follows:
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Expcpa-so-real(λ): Expso-ideal(λ):
Γ ← Par-Gen(1λ); Γ ← Par-Gen(1λ);
(PK,SK)← Keygen(Γ ) (M, st0)← S0(Γ )
(M, st0)← A0(PK,Γ ) Msg = (Msg1, . . . ,MsgN )←M
Msg = (Msg1, . . . ,MsgN )←M (I, st1)← S1(st0, 1|Msgi|)
r1, . . . , rn ←R outS ← S2
(
st1, {Msgi}i∈I
)
Ci ← Encrypt(PK,Msgi, ri) ∀i ∈ [N ], Output R(M,Msg, outS)
(I, st1)← A1
(
st0,C1, . . . ,CN
)
outA ← A2
(
st1, (Msgi, ri)i∈I
)
Output R(M,Msg, outA)
As usual, the adversarially-chosen message distribution M is efficiently samplable and
encoded as a polynomial-size circuit.
The notion of simulation-based chosen-ciphertext (SIM-SO-CCA) security is defined anal-
ogously. The only difference is in the real experiment Expcca-so-real, which is obtained from
Expcpa-so-real by granting the adversary access to a decryption oracle at all stages. Of course,
the adversary is disallowed to query the decryption of any ciphertext in the set {Ci}i∈[N ] of
challenge ciphertexts.
It is known [12] that SIM-SO-CPA security can be achieved from lossy encryption schemes
[17] when there exists an efficient Opener algorithm which, using the lossy secret key, can
explain a lossy ciphertext C as an encryption of any given plaintext. As observed in [17, 62],
this Opener algorithm can use the initial coins used in the generation of C for this purpose.
This property, formalized by Definition 11, is called efficient weak opening.
3 An All-But-Many Lossy Trapdoor Function from LWE
As a warm-up, we first describe a variant of the lossy trapdoor function suggested by Bellare
et al. [13, Section 5.2] that is better suited to our needs. We then extend this LWE-based
LTF into an ABM-LTF in Section 3.2.
3.1 An LWE-Based Lossy Trapdoor Function
All algorithms use a prime modulus q > 2, integers n ∈ poly(λ), m ≥ 2n log q and ` > 0,
an LWE noise distribution χ, and parameters σx, σe, γx, γe > 0. The function evaluation
sampling domain DomEλ = Dom
E
x × DomEe where DomEx (resp. DomEe ) is the set of x (resp.
e) in Zn (resp. Z2m) with ‖x‖ ≤ γx ·
√
n · σx (resp. ‖e‖ ≤ γe
√
2m · σe). Its inversion domain
is DomDλ = Dom
D
x × DomDe , where DomDx (resp. DomDe ) is the set of x (resp. e) in Zn (resp.
Z2m) with ‖x‖ ≤
√
n · σx (resp. ‖e‖ ≤
√
2m · σe) and its range is Rngλ = Z2mq . The function
inputs are sampled from the distribution DDomEλ = D
DomEx
Zn,σx ×D
DomEe
Z2m,σe .
Injective key generation. LTF.IGen(1λ) samples Ā ←↩ U(Zm×nq ) and runs (A,R) ←↩
GenTrap(Ā, In) to obtain A ∈ Z2m×nq together with a G-trapdoor R ∈ {−1, 1}m×m.
It outputs ek := A and ik := R.
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Lossy key generation. LTF.LGen(1λ) generates A ∈ Z2m×nq as a matrix of the form A =
B ·C + F with B←↩ U(Z2m×`q ), C←↩ U(Z`×nq ) and F←↩ χ2m×n. It outputs ek := A and
ik :=⊥.
Evaluation. LTF.Eval(ek, (x, e)) takes as input a domain element (x, e) ∈ DomEλ and maps
it to y = A · x + e ∈ Z2mq .
Inversion. LTF.Invert(ik,y) inputs a vector y ∈ Z2mq , uses the G-trapdoor ik = R of A to
find the unique (x, e) ∈ DomDλ such that y = A ·x+e. This is done by applying the LWE
inversion algorithm from Lemma 9.
Note that the construction differs from the lossy function of [13] in two ways. First, in [13],
the considered distribution over the function domain is uniform over a parallelepiped. We
instead consider a discrete Gaussian distribution. Second, in [13], the matrix C is chosen as
a small-norm integer matrix sampled from the LWE noise distribution. We instead sample it
uniformly. Both modifications are motivated by our application to SO-CCA security. Indeed,
in the security proof, we will generate C along with a lattice trapdoor (using GenTrap), which
we will use to simulate the function domain distribution conditioned on an image value.
We first study the conditional distribution of the pair (x, e) given its image under a lossy
function. This will be used to quantify the lossiness of the LTF.
Lemma 11. Let C ∈ Z`×nq and F ∈ Z2m×n. Sample (x, e) ←↩ DDomxZn,σx × D
Dome
Z2m,σe and de-
fine (u, f) = (C · x,F · x + e) ∈ Znq × Z2m. Note that e is fully determined by x,u and f .
Further, the conditional distribution of x given (u, f) is D
SF,u,f
Λ⊥(C>)+x′,
√
Σ,c
, with support
SF,u,f =
{
x̄ ∈ Λ⊥(C>) + x′ : x̄ ∈ Domx, f − F · x̄ ∈ Dome
}
,
where x′ is any solution to C · x′ = u and:
Σ = σ2x · σ2e · (σ2x · F> · F + σ2e · In)−1, c = σ2x · (σ2x · F> · F + σ2e · In)−1 · F> · f .
Proof. We first remark that the support of x|(u, f) is SF,u,f , since the set of solutions x̄ ∈ Zn
to u = C · x ∈ Z`q is Λ⊥(C>) + x′ and each such x̄ has a non-zero conditional probability
if and only if the corresponding ē = f − F · x is in Dome. Now, for x̄ ∈ Zn in the support
SF,u,f , we have
Pr[x = x̄|(u, f)] ∼DZn,σx(x̄) ·DZ2m,σe(f − F · x̄)
∼ exp
(
−π
(
‖x̄‖2
σ2x
+
‖f − F · x̄‖2
σ2e
))
∼ exp
(
−π
(
(x̄− c)> ·Σ−1 · (x̄− c)
))
.
The last equality follows from expanding the norms and collecting terms. ut
We now formally state for which parameters we can prove that the scheme above is an
LTF. The second part of the theorem will be useful for our SO-CCA encryption application.
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Theorem 1. Let χ = DZ,β/(2
√
λ) for some β > 0. Let us assume that ` ≥ λ, n = Ω(` log q)
and m ≥ 2n log q, γx ≥ 3
√
m/n and γe ≥ 3. Assume further that σx ≥ Ω(n), σe ≤ O(q/m3/2)
and σe ≥ Ω(
√
mn · β · σx). Then, under the LWE`,2m,q,χ hardness assumption, the above
construction is an l-lossy LTF with l ≥ n log σx − 2− ` log q > Ω(n log n). Further, any ppt
indistinguishability adversary A implies an LWE distinguisher D with comparable running
time such that
AdvA,LTF(λ) ≤ n ·AdvD,LWE`,2m,q,χ(λ).
Moreover, there is a ppt sampling algorithm, that given (B,C,F) generated by LTF.LGen(1λ),
a trapdoor basis (bi)i≤n for Λ
⊥(C>) such that maxi ‖bi‖ ≤ σxσe/(Ω(log n) ·
√
2mnβ2σ2x + σ
2
e)
and a function output y = LTF.Eval(ek, (x, e)) for an input (x, e) ←↩ DDom
E
x
Zn,σx × D
DomEe
Z2m,σe,
outputs, with probability ≥ 1− 2−Ω(λ) over ek and (x, e), an independent sample (x̄, ē) from
the conditional distribution of (x, e) conditioned on y = LTF.Eval(ek, (x, e)).
Proof. First, the construction is correct. Indeed, by Lemmas 4 and 5, if σx ≥ Ω(
√
m) and
σe ≥ Ω(
√
m), the distribution DZn,σx ×DZ2m,σe is efficiently samplable, and a sample from
it belongs to DomEλ with probability ≥ 1 − 2−Ω(λ), so DDomEλ is efficiently samplable. For
inversion correctness, we consider (x, e) ∈ DomDλ , and set y = A · x + e. By Lemma 9, we
can recover (x, e) from y using the G-trapdoor R of A if ‖e‖ ≤ q/(10 · ‖R‖). The fact that
‖R‖ ≤ m and the parameter choices guarantee this.
The lossy and injective modes are computationally indistinguishable under the LWE`,2m,q,χ
assumption. A standard hybrid argument over the columns of A ∈ Z2m×nq provides the
inequality between the respective success advantages.
We now focus on the lossiness property. Note that Lemma 11 describes the conditional
distribution of (x, e) conditioned on (C ·x,F ·x+e). We claim that, except with probability
≤ 2−Ω(λ) over ek generated by LTF.LGen(1λ), this is also the distribution of (x, e) conditioned
on LTF.Eval(ek, (x, e)). Indeed, LTF.Eval(ek, (x, e)) = B · C · x + F · x + e ∈ Z2mq uniquely
determines u = C · x ∈ Z`q and f = F · x + e ∈ Dome if ‖f‖∞ < λ∞1 (Λ(B))/2 for all
(x, e) ∈ DomE. The latter condition is satisfied except with probability ≤ 2−Ω(λ) over the
choice of ek. This is because ‖f‖∞ ≤
√
2m ·β
√
nσx+
√
2mσx ≤ 2
√
2m ·σe < q/8 except with
probability 2−Ω(λ) over the choice of F, and λ∞1 (Λ(B))/2 ≥ q/4 with probability ≤ 2−Ω(λ)
over the choice of B, by Lemma 3.
We now show that the conditional distribution D
SF,u,f
Λ⊥(C>)+x′,
√
Σ,c
given by Lemma 11 for
x conditioned on LTF.Eval(ek, (x, e)) has min-entropy at least l and is efficiently samplable.
For every x̄ ∈ SF,u,f , we have
D
SF,u,f
Λ⊥(C>)+x′,
√
Σ,c
(x̄) =
1
pa
·DΛ⊥(C>)+x′,√Σ,c(x̄), pa = DΛ⊥(C>)+x′,√Σ,c(SF,u,f ).
For min-entropy, we observe that, by Lemma 6, the point with highest probability in
DΛ⊥(C>)+x′,
√
Σ,c has probability≤ 2 det(Λ⊥(C>))/
√
det(Σ) . We can apply Lemma 6 because
σn(
√
Σ) ≥ η2−n(Λ⊥(C>)) with overwhelming probability. Indeed, thanks to assumption on χ,
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we have ‖F> · F‖ ≤ 2mnβ2 with probability ≥ 1 − 2−Ω(λ). When this inequality holds, we
have
σn(
√
Σ) ≥ σxσe/
√
2mnβ2σ2x + σ
2
e .
Further, by Lemma 3, we have η2−n(Λ
⊥(C>)) ≤ O(
√
nq`/n) with probability ≥ 1 − 2−Ω(`).
Hence the assumption of Lemma 6 holds, thanks to our parameter choices. Overall, we obtain
that the scheme is l-lossy for
l ≥ log
√
det Σ− log det(Λ⊥(C>))− 1− log(1/pa).
By calculations similar to those above, we have that
√
det Σ ≤ σnx . Further, matrix C has
rank ` with probability ≥ 1− 2−Ω(`), and, when this is the case, we have det(Λ⊥(C>)) = q`.
We obtain l ≥ n log σx − 1− ` log q − log(1/pa).
To complete the lossiness proof, we show that pa ≥ 1 − 2−Ω(λ) so that log(1/pa) ≤ 1,
except with probability ≤ 2−Ω(λ) over (F,C,x,e). For this, we have by a union bound that
pa ≥ 1 − (px + pe), where px is the probability that a sample x̄ from DΛ⊥(C>)+x′,√Σ,c lands
outside DomEx (i.e., ‖x̄‖ > γx ·
√
n · σx), and pe is the probability that a sample x̄ from
DΛ⊥(C>)+x′,
√
Σ,c is such that f −F · x̄ lands outside Dom
E
e (i.e., ‖f −F · x̄‖ > γe ·
√
2m · σe).
In order to bound px, we observe that it is at most
p′x = Pr
x̄←↩D
Λ⊥(C>)+x′,
√
Σ,c
[‖x̄− c‖ > ‖
√
Σ‖ ·
√
n]
if γx ·
√
n · σx ≥ ‖c‖ + ‖
√
Σ‖ ·
√
n. Now, using that ‖F‖ ≤
√
2mn · β, ‖x‖ ≤
√
n · σx
and ‖e‖ ≤
√
2m · σe except with probability 2−Ω(λ), by Lemma 5, we get with the same
probability that ‖c‖ ≤ (σx/σe)2 ·
√
2mnβ · (
√
2mn · β · σx ·
√
n + σe ·
√
2m). Furthermore,
using ‖
√
Σ‖ ≤ σx/σe, we have that the condition γx ·
√
n · σx ≥ ‖c‖+ ‖
√
Σ‖ ·
√
n is satisfied
by our choice of parameters. Also, as shown above, we have σn(
√
Σ) ≥ η2−n(Λ⊥(C>)) with
overwhelming probability, so that we can apply Lemma 5 to conclude that px ≤ p′x ≤ 2−n+2
with probability ≥ 1− 2−Ω(λ).
In order to bound pe, we follow a similar computation as for px. Namely, we first ob-
serve that, if x̄ is sampled from DΛ⊥(C>)+x′,
√
Σ,c, then ē = f − F · x̄ is distributed as
DF·Λ⊥(C>)+f−F·x′,
√
FΣF>,f−F·c. Therefore, the probability pe is at most the probability p
′
e that
a sample ē from DF·Λ⊥(C>)+f−F·x′,
√
FΣF>,f−F·c satisfies ‖ē− (f −F · c)‖ > ‖
√
FΣF>‖ ·
√
2m,
assuming that the condition
γe ·
√
2m · σe ≥ ‖f − F · c‖+ ‖
√
FΣF>‖ ·
√
2m, (1)
is satisfied. Now, using ‖f − F · c‖ ≤ ‖f‖ + ‖F‖ · ‖c‖ and the above bounds on ‖F‖, ‖f‖
and ‖c‖ and our choice of parameters, we have that condition (1) is satisfied with over-
whelming probability. In order to apply Lemma 5 and bound p′e, we also need the inequality
σn(
√
FΣF>) ≥ η2−n(F · Λ⊥(C>)) to be satisfied. Now, note that
σn(
√
FΣF>) = σx · σe/
√
σ2x + σ
2
e/σn(F)
2.
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By Lemma 7, we have σn(F) ≥ Ω(
√
m ·β) with overwhelming probability. We conclude that
σn(
√
FΣF>) ≥ Ω(σx ·
√
m · β). On the other hand, Lemma 7 also implies that
η2−n(F · Λ⊥(C>)) ≤ ‖F‖ · η2−n(Λ⊥(C>)) = O(‖F‖ ·
√
n) ≤ O(β ·
√
m · n)
with overwhelming probability. Hence, the condition σn(
√
FΣF>) ≥ η2−n(F ·Λ⊥(C>)) holds
with with the same probability thanks to our choice of parameters. We can thus apply
Lemma 5 to conclude that pe ≤ p′e ≤ 2−n+2 with overwhelming probability.
Overall, we have that pa ≥ 1 − (px + pe) ≥ 1 − 2−Ω(λ) which completes the proof of
lossiness. This also immediately implies that the conditional distribution D
SF,u,f
Λ⊥(C>)+x′,
√
Σ,c
is
efficiently samplable by rejection sampling, given an efficient sampler for DΛ⊥(C>)+x′,
√
Σ,c.
The latter sampler can be implemented with a ppt algorithm by Lemma 4 and the fact that
maxi ‖bi‖ < σn(Σ) with overwhelming probability by the bound on σn(
√
Σ). ut
3.2 An All-But-Many Lossy Trapdoor Function from LWE
Parameters and domains are defined as in Section 3.1.
Key generation. ABM.Gen(1λ) conducts the following steps.
1. For parameters n, `,m, γ, χ, generate Ā ∈ Zm×nq as Ā = B·C+F with B←↩ U(Zm×`q ),
C←↩ U(Z`×nq ) and F←↩ χm×n.
2. Choose a PRF family PRF : {0, 1}λ × {0, 1}k → {0, 1}λ with input length k = k(λ)
and key length λ. Choose a seed K ←↩ U({0, 1}λ) for PRF.
3. Sample matrices R1, . . . ,Rλ ←↩ U({−1, 1}m×m) and compute
Bi = Ri · Ā +K[i] ·G ∈ Zm×nq ∀i ≤ λ.
4. Output the evaluation key ek, the inversion key ik and the lossy tag generation key
tk, which consist of
ek :=
(
Ā, (Bi)i≤λ
)
, ik :=
(
(Ri)i≤λ, K
)
, tk := K. (2)
A tag t = (tc, ta) ∈ {0, 1}λ × {0, 1}k will be injective whenever tc 6= PRF(K, ta).
Lossy tag generation. ABM.LTag(tk, ta) takes as input an auxiliary tag component ta ∈
{0, 1}k and uses tk = K to compute and output tc = PRF(K, ta).
Evaluation. ABM.Eval(ek, t, (x, e)) takes in the function input (x, e) ∈ DomEλ , the tag
t = (tc, ta) ∈ {0, 1}λ × {0, 1}k and proceeds as follows.
1. For each j ≤ λ, let CPRF,j(ta) : {0, 1}λ → {0, 1} be the NAND Boolean circuit,
where ta ∈ {0, 1}k is hard-wired, which evaluates the j-th bit of PRF(K̃, ta) ∈ {0, 1}λ
for any K̃ ∈ {0, 1}λ. Run the public evaluation algorithm of Lemma 10 to obtain6
BPRF,j ← Evalpub(CPRF,j(ta), (Bi)i≤λ).
6 One may use either EvalpubCCT or Eval
pub
BP , but the choice must be consistent with the Eval
priv variant used in function
inversion.
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2. Define the matrix
At =
[
Ā∑
j≤λ
(
(−1)tc[j] ·BPRF,j + tc[j] ·G
)] ∈ Z2m×nq ,
and compute the output y = At · x + e ∈ Z2mq .
Inversion. ABM.Invert(ik, t,y) inputs the inversion key ik :=
(
(Ri)i≤λ, K
)
, the tag t =
(tc, ta) ∈ {0, 1}λ × {0, 1}k and y ∈ Rngλ, and proceeds as follows.
1. Return ⊥ if tc = PRF(K, ta).
2. Otherwise, for each j ≤ λ, run the private evaluation algorithm from Lemma 10 to
obtain RPRF,j ← Evalpriv(CPRF,j(ta), (Ri)i≤λ) and compute the (small-norm) matrix
Rt =
∑
j≤λ(−1)tc[j] ·RPRF,j ∈ Zm×m.
3. Let ht denote the Hamming distance between tc and PRF(K, ta). Use the G-trapdoor
Rt of At with tag ht to find the unique (x, e) ∈ DomDλ such that y = At · x + e. This
is done by applying the LWE inversion algorithm of Lemma 9.
All algorithms involved run in polynomial-time, if one uses EvalpubCCT and Eval
priv
CCT from
Lemma 10. If the circuits CPRF,j(ta) (having the PRF key as input, and the PRF input
hardwired) have logarithmic depth d ≤ O(log λ), then it is preferable to use EvalpubBP and
EvalprivBP instead. Indeed, under this small-depth assumption, these algorithms still run in
polynomial-time, and have the advantage of leading to smaller Rt’s. This eventually allows
one to set q as a polynomial function of λ. In the rest of this section, we choose these variants
of Evalpub and Evalpriv. The results can be readily adapted to the other option.
Theorem 2. Let χ = DZ,β/(2
√
λ) for some β > 0. Assume that PRF has depth d = O(log λ)
when the circuit input is the key and the PRF input is hard-coded in the circuit. Assume
that ` ≥ λ, n = Ω(` log q) and m ≥ 2n log q, γx ≥ 3
√
m/n and γe ≥ 3. Assume also that
σx ≥ Ω(n), σe ≥ Ω(4d ·m2 · β ·
√
n · σx) and σe ≤ O(q/(λ · 4d ·m2)). Then, under the PRF
security and LWE`,2m,q,χ hardness assumptions, the above function is an l-lossy ABM LTF
with l = Ω(n log n).
The theorem follows from the lemmas below.
Lemma 12 (Correctness). Let us assume that and q/σe ≥ λ·4d ·O(m2). Assume that PRF
has logarithmic depth O(log λ) when the circuit input is the key and the PRF input is hard-
coded in the circuit. Then, for any triple (ek, ik, tk) produced by ABM.Gen(1λ), for any tag t =
(tc, ta) ∈ {0, 1}λ × {0, 1}k satisfying tc 6= PRF(K, ta) and for any input (x, e) ∈ DomDλ , the
inversion correctness condition (x, e) = ABM.Invert(ik, t,ABM.Eval(ek, t, (x, e))) is satisfied.
Proof. By Lemma 10, we have ‖Rt‖ ≤ λ · 4d ·O(m3/2) and
At =
[
Ā
Rt · Ā + ht ·G
]
mod q,
where ht is the Hamming distance between tc and PRF(K, ta) ∈ {0, 1}λ. As q > λ is prime,
integer ht is invertible modulo q, and Rt is a G-trapdoor with tag ht for At. Thanks to
our parameters, we have ‖e‖ ≤ q/(10 · ‖Rt‖) and hence algorithm Invert from Lemma 9
recovers (x, e). ut
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Our ABM-LTF provides evasiveness unless the PRF family is not unpredictable, which
would contradict its pseudorandomness. In order to meaningfully rely on the pseudoran-
domness of PRF, the proof of Lemma 13 also appeals to the LWE assumption so as to first
move to a game where the lossy matrix Ā ∈ Zm×nq is traded for a random matrix. Since the
matrices Bi = Ri · Ā +K[i] ·G depend the bits of the seed K, moving to a uniform matrix
Ā is necessary to make sure that the evaluation key ek is statistically independent of K.
Lemma 13 (Evasiveness). Assume that m ≥ 2n log q. Any ppt evasiveness adversary A
making Q1 and Q2 queries to ABM.LTag and ABM.IsLossy, respectively, implies an LWE
distinguisher D1 and a PRF distinguisher D2 such that
AdvA,evaQ1,Q2(λ) ≤ n ·Adv
D1,LWE
`,m,q,χ (λ) + Adv
D2,PRF
Q1+Q2
(λ) +
Q2 + 1
2λ
.
Proof. Let us assume the existence of a ppt evasiveness adversary A with non-negligible
advantage AdvA,evaQ1,Q2(λ). Without loss of generality, we can consider the adversary A as
successful as soon as it manages to query the ABM.IsLossy(tk, ·) oracle with input a non-trivial
lossy tag t? = (t?c, t
?
a), i.e., a tag such that t
?
a has never been submitted to the ABM.LTag(tk, ·)
oracle. Note that, for any input (t′c, ta) 6= (tc, ta) such that tc ← ABM.LTag(tk, ta), the oracle
ABM.IsLossy(tk, ·) returns 0 since tc is a deterministic function of ta.
We show that A implies either an LWE`,m,q,χ distinguisher D1 or a PRF distinguisher
D2 with noticeable advantage. To this end, we consider a sequence of games that begins
with the real evasiveness game and ends with a game where the adversary’s advantage is
statistically negligible. For each i, we call Wi the event that the adversary wins, in which
case the challenger outputs 1.
Game 0: This is the real evasiveness game where the adversary A is fed with a real
evaluation ek and interacts with the real ABM.LTag(tk, ·) oracle. We call W0 the event
that, at some point of the game, the adversary A queries ABM.IsLossy(tk, ·) for a non-
trivial input t? = (t?c, t
?
a) such that t
?
c = PRF(K, t
?
a), where tk = K, and t
?
a has never
been queried to ABM.LTag(tk, ·). By assumption, we know that A wins with probability
Pr[W0] = Adv
A,eva
Q1,Q2
(λ).
Game 1: This game is identical Game 0, except that we modify the distribution of the
evaluation key ek. Namely, the matrix Ā ∈ Zm×nq is now sampled uniformly. Under the
LWE`,m,q,χ assumption, this change does not significantly affect A’s winning probability.
Using the hybrid argument, we obtain that |Pr[W1]−Pr[W0]| ≤ n ·AdvD1,LWE`,m,q,χ (λ), for some
efficient algorithm D1.
Game 2: This game is identical to Game 1 with the difference that the matrices (Bi)i≤λ
are now sampled uniformly in Zm×nq . Lemma 2 implies that the distribution of ek remains
statistically unchanged: we have |Pr[W2] − Pr[W1]| ≤ 2−λ. We remark that the PRF seed
tk = K is now perfectly independent of ek.
Game 3: This game is like Game 2 but we modify the ABM.LTag(tk, ·) and ABM.IsLossy(tk, ·)
oracles. Instead of returning tc = PRF(K, ta) at each query of the form ABM.LTag(tk, ta), the
ABM.LTag(tk, ·) oracle outputs R(ta) ∈ {0, 1}λ, where R : {0, 1}k → {0, 1}λ is a uniformly
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random function, which the challenger lazily defines by uniformly sampling a λ-bit string at
each new query ta ∈ {0, 1}k. At each query to ABM.IsLossy(tk, ·), adversary A chooses a tag
t and we call W3 the event that one of these tags t
? = (t?c, t
?
a) satisfies t
?
c = R(t
?
a) although t
?
a
has never been queried to ABM.LTag(tk, ·). Given that R(·) is a truly random function, we
have Pr[W3] = Q2/2
λ, where Q2 is the number of queries to ABM.IsLossy(tk, ·). Moreover,
as explained below, there exists a PRF distinguisher D2 that makes at most Q1 + Q2 PRF
evaluation queries and such that |Pr[W3]− Pr[W2]| ≤ AdvD2,PRFQ1+Q2 (λ).
AlgorithmD2 interacts with a PRF challenger that chooses a uniform keyK? ←↩ U({0, 1}λ)
and either always outputs PRF(K?,M) at each query M or always outputs uniform values
in the range {0, 1}λ of PRF(K?, ·).
To generate the evaluation key for A, D2 chooses random matrices Ā ←↩ U(Zm×nq ) and
Bi ←↩ U(Zm×nq ) for each i ≤ λ and runs A on input of ek =
(
Ā, (Bi)i≤λ
)
. Note that the dis-
tribution of ek is identical to that of Game 2. Whenever A invokes ABM.LTag(tk, ·) on input
of an auxiliary tag part ta ∈ {0, 1}k, distinguisher D2 submits ta to its own PRF challenger
and relays the response back to A. At each query t = (tc, ta) made by A to ABM.IsLossy(tk, ·),
distinguisher D2 submits the corresponding ta ∈ {0, 1}k to its PRF challenger. When obtain-
ing the response v ∈ {0, 1}λ, it checks if tc = v. If so, distinguisher D2 halts, and outputs 1 to
declare the adversary successful. If A terminates without having queried ABM.IsLossy(tk, ·)
on such a lossy tag, distinguisher D2 outputs 0.
Let us assume that D2’s challenger always outputs pseudo-random values PRF(K?, ta)
when invoked on the input ta. In this case, A’s view is the same as in Game 2, so that
D2 outputs 1 with probability Pr[W2]. If D2’s challenger always returns evaluations of a
perfectly random function, distinguisher D2 outputs 1 with probability Pr[W3] as A’s view
corresponds to Game 3. It comes that D2’s advantage as a PRF distinguisher is at least
|Pr[W3]− Pr[W2]|, as claimed.
Putting the above altogether completes the proof of the lemma. ut
The pseudo-randomness of core tag components also guarantees that lossy tags are com-
putationally indistinguishable from uniformly random tags. The proof of Lemma 14 also
relies on the LWE assumption since the evaluation key ek only hides the PRF seed K in the
computational sense. It follows the same strategy as the proof of Lemma 13.
Lemma 14 (Indistinguishability). Assume that m > 2n log q. Then ppt indistinguisha-
bility adversary A implies either either an LWE distinguisher D1 or a PRF distinguisher D2
such that:
AdvA,indQ (λ) ≤ 2n ·Adv
D1,LWE
`,m,q,χ (λ) + Adv
D2,PRF
Q (λ) +
1
2λ−1
,
where Q denotes the number of (genuine or uniform) lossy tag generation queries.
Proof. Let A be an adversary that has non-negligible advantage in distinguishing outputs of
the lossy tag generation oracle ABM.LTag(tk, ·) from uniform elements in Tc = {0, 1}λ. We
show that A implies either an LWE`,m,q,χ distinguisher D1 or a PRF distinguisher D2. We
prove this claim using a sequence of games that begins with a game where A interacts with
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an oracle ABM.LTag(tk, ·) that always outputs the unique tc such that t = (tc, ta) ∈ Tloss at
each query ta. In the final game, adversary A interacts with an oracle OTc(·) that outputs
uniform strings in {0, 1}λ. For each i, we call Wi the event that the adversary outputs 1.
Game 0: In this game, adversary A is given a real evaluation key ek and interacts with
an oracle ABM.LTag(tk, ·) that outputs tc = PRF(K, ta), where tk = K, at each query
ta ∈ {0, 1}k. When A halts, it outputs a bit b ∈ {0, 1} and we call W0 the event that b = 1.
Game 1: This game is like Game 0 except that we modify the distribution of the evaluation
key ek. Namely, the matrix Ā ∈ Zm×nq is sampled uniformly. As in the proof of Lemma 13,
we have |Pr[W1]− Pr[W0]| ≤ n ·AdvD1,LWE`,m,q,χ (λ), for some efficient algorithm D1
Game 2: This game is like Game 1 except that the matrices (Bi)i≤λ are now sampled
uniformly in Zm×nq . As in the proof of Lemma 13, we have |Pr[W2]− Pr[W1]| ≤ 2−λ.
Game 3: This game is identical to Game 2 but we replace the ABM.LTag(tk, ·) oracle by
the oracle OTc(·) that outputs random λ-bit strings at each new query and consistently
returns the same outputs if a given query ta occurs more than once. Instead of returning
tc = PRF(K, ta) at each query ta, the oracle thus outputs R(ta) ∈ {0, 1}λ, where R : {0, 1}k →
{0, 1}λ is a uniformly random function, which is lazily defined by sampling random strings
in {0, 1}λ at each new query ta ∈ {0, 1}k. When A halts, it outputs a bit b ∈ {0, 1} and we
call W3 the event that b = 1.
It can be seen that Pr[W3] is close to Pr[W2] if PRF is a pseudo-random function fam-
ily, as there is a distinguisher D2 such that |Pr[W3] − Pr[W2]| ≤ AdvD2,PRFQ (λ). In short,
distinguisher D2 interacts with a PRF challenger that chooses a key K? ←↩ U({0, 1}λ)
and either always outputs PRF(K?,M) at each query M or always outputs random strings
{0, 1}λ at each fresh query. To generate the evaluation key for A, distinguisher D2 samples
Ā ←↩ U(Zm×nq ) and Bi ←↩ U(Zm×nq ) for each i ≤ λ and feeds A with ek =
(
Ā, (Bi)i≤λ
)
.
Whenever A queries ABM.LTag(tk, ·) on input of an auxiliary tag ta ∈ {0, 1}k, distinguisher
D2 queries ta to its PRF challenger and relays the answer to A. When A terminates, distin-
guisher D2 outputs whatever A outputs. If D2’s challenger always outputs pseudo-random
values PRF(K?, ta) on input of ta, then A’s view is clearly the same as in Game 2. If D2’s
challenger always outputs uniformly random strings in {0, 1}λ, then D2 is providing A with
the same view as in Game 3. We thus have |Pr[W3]−Pr[W2]| ≤ AdvD2,PRFQ (λ), as claimed.
Game 4: This game is like Game 3, except that we change again the generation of matrices
(Bi)i≤λ in the evaluation key ek. For each i ≤ λ, we step back to computing Bi = Ri·Ā+K[i]·
G ∈ Zm×nq , with Ri ←↩ U({−1, 1}m×m) and K[i]←↩ U({0, 1}). By the same argument as in
Game 2, the view of A remains statistically unchanged and we have |Pr[W4]−Pr[W3]| ≤ 2−λ.
Game 5: We restore the matrix Ā ∈ Zm×nq back to its original distribution. Under the
LWE`,m,q,χ assumption, we have |Pr[W5] − Pr[W4]| ≤ n · AdvD1,LWE`,m,q,χ (λ), for some efficient
algorithm D1.
Combining the above leads to the claimed bound on AdvA,indQ (λ). ut
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The proof of lossiness is essentially identical to that of the LTF (Theorem 1).
Lemma 15 (Lossiness). Let χ = DZ,β/(2
√
λ) for some β > 0. Assume that the depth d of
PRF is in O(log λ), when the circuit input is the key and the PRF input is hardwired in the
circuit. Let us assume that ` ≥ λ and n = Ω(` log q). Assume also that σe ≥ Ω(4d ·m2 ·β ·σx ·√
n). Then, for any lossy tag t = (tc, ta), the above ABM-LTF is l-lossy with l = Ω(n log n).
Proof. We rely on the fact that, for any lossy tag t = (tc, ta) (i.e., for which tc = PRF(K, ta)),
we have
At =
[
Ā
Rt · Ā
]
=
[
B
Rt ·B
]
·C +
[
F
Rt · F
]
, (3)
where B←↩ U(Zm×`q ), C←↩ U(Z`×nq ), F←↩ χm×n and Rt is as in the ABM.Invert description.
As a consequence, by the same argument as in the proof of Theorem 1, the distribution
of the input (x, e) conditioned on ABM.Eval(ek, t, (x, e)) is the same as the distribution of
(x, e) conditioned on (C · x,F · x + e). From this point, the proof is identical to that of
Theorem 1, with Fnew = [F
> | (Rt · F)>]> playing the role of F in the original proof. The
two properties of Fnew used in the proof are ‖Fnew‖ ≤ (1 + ‖Rt‖) · ‖F‖ ≤ O(4d ·m3/2) · ‖F‖,
using Lemma 10, which leads to a larger σe by the factor O(4
d ·m3/2). The other property is
a lower bound on σn(Fnew) and since the latter is ≥ σn(F), no parameters are affected. ut
In [4, Section 7], Alwen et al. used the a rounding technique [6] to build an all-but-
one trapdoor function. While our construction bears resemblance with theirs, our proof of
lossiness is very different. In [4, Theorem 7.3], they consider a matrix of the form (3) and
crucially rely on the statistical independence of the rows of [B> | (R0 · B)>]>, for some
R0 ∈ {−1, 1}m×m, conditionally on R0 · F. Here, we cannot guarantee that matrices Rt ·B
be statistically independent for different tags t, and hence it does not seem possible to directly
use the rounding technique from [4]. Fortunately, the proof of Lemma 15 does not require
the rows of the matrix [B> | (Rt ·B)>]> to be statistically independent and neither does it
rely on the independence of Rt ·B for different tags t.
3.3 Joint Use of Lossy and All-But-Many Functions
We remark that our LTF and ABM-LTF are not lossy enough to be correlation-secure in
the sense of Rosen and Segev [80]: indeed, the result of [80, Theorem 3.3] requires lossy
functions that lose at least half of their input. In particular, we cannot reveal y0 = A ·x + e
and y = At ·x+e for the same input (x, e) as this would expose y−y0 = (A−At) ·x, which
would leak (x, e). However, we can safely reveal y0 = LTF.Eval(ek
′, (x, e0)) = A · x + e0 and
y = ABM.Eval(ek, t, (x, e)) = At · x + e for distinct Gaussian terms e0, e ∈ Z2m.
Indeed, conditionally on LTF.Eval(ek′, (x, e0)) and ABM.Eval(ek, t, (x, e)), the distribution
of x retains l bits of min-entropy, where l = Ω(n · log n). As in the proof of Theorem 1, this
follows by observing that the residual distribution on x is a discrete Gaussian (by Lemma 15)
whose covariance matrix is above the smoothing parameter of the support.
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Lemma 16. The LTF of Section 3.1 and the above ABM-LTF are jointly lossy when they
share the first part x of their inputs.
Let χ = DZ,β/(2
√
λ) for some β > 0. Assume that the depth d of PRF is in O(log λ), when
the circuit input is the key and the PRF input is hardwired in the circuit. Let us assume
that ` ≥ λ and n = Ω(` log q). Assume also that σe ≥ Ω(4d ·m2 · β ·
√
n · σx). Then, except
with probability ≤ 2−Ω(λ) over the choice of ek′ ←↩ LTF.LGen(1λ), ek ←↩ ABM.Gen(1λ),
x←↩ Domx, and e0, e←↩ Dome, we have, for any lossy tag t:
H∞
(
x | LTF.Eval(ek′, (x, e0)), ABM.Eval(ek, t, (x, e))
)
≥ n · log σx − 2− ` log q > Ω(n · log n).
Proof. The result follows by generalizing the proofs of Theorem 1 and Lemma 15 in a straight-
forward manner. If ALTF = BLTF ·CLTF+FLTF ∈ Z2m×nq and Ā = BABM ·CABM+FABM ∈ Zm×nq
are the lossy matrices of both functions, the information revealed by LTF.Eval(ek′, (x, e0))
and ABM.Eval(ek, t, (x, e)) is BLTF 02m×`0m×` BABM
0m×` Rt ·BABM
 · [CLTF
CABM
]
· x +
 FLTFFABM
Rt · FABM
 · x + [e0
e
]
.
It is thus entirely determined by the product [C>LTF | C>ABM]> ·x ∈ Z2`q and the integer vector
[F>LTF | F>ABM | (Rt · FABM)>]> · x + [e>0 | e>1 ]> ∈ Z4m. We obtain the result by repeating the
arguments in the proof of Theorem 1 and Lemma 15. ut
4 Selective Opening Chosen-Ciphertext Security
We now combine our ABM-LTF and the LWE-based LTF of Section 3 to build an IND-SO-
CCA2-secure public-key encryption scheme from the LWE assumption. The scheme can be
seen as instantiating a variant of the Peikert-Waters methodology [76], as generalized by
Hofheinz [57, Section 6.3] to the case of multiple lossy tags. In [57], ciphertexts consists of
(flossy(x), fABM(t, x),Msg ⊕ h(x)), where flossy(x) (resp. fABM(t, x)) is a lossy (resp. all-but-
many) function of x; t is the tag of the ciphertext; and h(x) is a universal hash of x.
Nevertheless, our scheme is not a generic instantiation of this paradigm as we cannot
use exactly the same input x in the two functions flossy(·) and fABM(t, ·). As we mentioned
earlier, we cannot give out function outputs y0 = A · x + e and y = At · x + e for the same
input (x, e). For this reason, our lossy and ABM functions have to use distinct noise terms
(e0, e) in the two evaluations y0 = A · x + e0 and y = At · x + e. The decryption algorithm
can proceed by inverting (x, e0) ← f−1lossy(y0) as before. However, instead of simply testing
if y = fABM(t, (x, e0)) by evaluating fABM(t, .) in the forward direction as in [76, 57], the
receiver has to test whether y −At · x is a small-norm vector, analogously to [75, Section
4.4]. For this reason, the message Msg is hidden by the universal hash of x only, which is
sufficient in our security proof. Moreover, our extension to SIM-SO-CCA2 security requires
h(·) to operate on x alone.
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Unlike [76], we cannot use one-time signatures to bind ciphertext components in a non-
malleable manner. Indeed, at each corruption query, the challenger would have to reveal the
one-time secret keys of the challenge ciphertexts, which would allow the adversary to make
decryption queries for lossy tags.
Instead, we rely on hybrid encryption and proceed analogously to Boyen et al. [28]:
namely, we define the auxiliary tags to be the output y0 = Π
LTF.Eval(ek′, (x, e0)) of the lossy
function while resorting to the hybrid encryption paradigm and authenticate the message-
carrying part c0 = Msg + h(x) of the ciphertext via the encrypt-then-MAC approach. One
difficulty is that, since y0 = Π
LTF.Eval(ek′, (x, e0)) and y = Π
ABM.Eval(ek, t, (x, e)) involve
distinct small-norm vectors e0, e, we must find a different way to prevent the adversary from
tampering with e in one of the challenge ciphertexts (indeed, the ABM-LTF output y is no
longer authenticated by a one-time signature). Our solution to this problem is to include
y = ΠABM.Eval(ek, t, (x, e)) in the input of the MAC, which simultaneously authenticates y
and c0. For simplicity, we assume MACs with the uniqueness property but the proof can be
adapted to rely on any strongly unforgeable MAC.
As mentioned in [57, Section 6], the application to IND-SO-CCA2 security requires the
core tag space Tc of ABM-LTFs to be efficiently samplable and explainable. As defined in
[57, Definition 6.2], “explainability” (a.k.a. “invertible samplability” [38]) means that any
core tag tc can be explained by the challenger as having been uniformly chosen “without
ulterior motive” when the adversary opens a given ciphertext in the game of Definition 10.
Our ABM-LTF clearly satisfies this property since core tags tc are just random λ-bit strings.
4.1 Description
Par-Gen(1λ): Selects public parameters consisting of:
- A modulus q > 2, integers `, `0, `1, n ∈ poly(λ), m = dcn · log qe, for some constant
c > 0, and parameters β, σx, σe > 0.
- The specification MAC = (KG, Sig,Ver) of a unique message authentication code with
message space MsgSpmac := Z2mq × Z`0q and key space Kmac := Z`1q .
- A family UH of universal hash functions h : [−σx
√
n, σx
√
n]n → Z`0+`1q that range
over MsgSp := Z`0q .
The public parameters Γ = {`, `0, `1, n,m, q, β, σx, σe,MAC} define the plaintext space
MsgSp := Z`0q and will be shared by the LWE-based LTF of Section 3.1 and our ABM-
LTF of Section 3.2.
Keygen(Γ ): Let ΠLTF = (IGen, LGen,Eval, Invert) be an instance of the LTF of Section 3.1
and let ΠABM = (Gen,Eval, Invert, LTag) be an instance of the ABM-LTF of Section 3.2.
We assume ΠLTF and ΠABM both operate over the domain
DomDλ := {(x, e) ∈ Zn × Z2m | ‖x‖ ≤ σx
√
n, ‖e‖ ≤ σe
√
2m}.
The public key is generated via the following steps.
1. Generate a pair (ek′, ik′)← ΠLTF.IGen(1λ) for an injective function of the lossy trap-
door function family ΠLTF.
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2. Generate (ek, ik, tk)← ΠABM.Gen(1λ) as an ABM-LTF key pair. We assume that the
space of auxiliary tags is Ta = Zmq
3. Choose a random member h← UH of the universal hash family.
Output (PK, SK) where PK =
(
ek′, ek, h
)
and SK = ik′.
Encrypt(PK,Msg): To encrypt Msg ∈ Z`0q , choose x←↩ DZn,σx , e0 ←↩ DZ2m,σe , e←↩ DZ2m,σe
and do the following.
1. Compute y0 = Π
LTF.Eval(ek′, (x, e0)) = A · x + e0 ∈ Z2mq .
2. Define ta = y0 and choose a random tc ←↩ U(Tc). Then, let t = (tc, ta) and compute
y = ΠABM.Eval(ek, t, (x, e)) = At · x + e ∈ Z2mq .
3. Compute (ksym,kmac) = h(x) ∈ Z`0q × Z`1q .
4. Set c0 = Msg + k
sym ∈ Z`0q and c1 = MAC.Sig(kmac, (y, c0)).
Output the ciphertext C = (tc, c0, c1,y0,y).
Decrypt(SK,C): To decrypt C = (tc, c0, c1,y0,y) using SK = ik′,
1. Compute (x, e0)← ΠLTF.Invert(ik′,y0). Return ⊥ if the vector y0 ∈ Z2mq is not in the
range7 of ΠLTF.Eval(ek′, ·) or if (x, e0) 6∈ DomDλ .
2. Define the tag t = (tc,y0). If ‖y −At · x‖ > σe
√
2m, return ⊥.
3. Compute (ksym,kmac) = h(x) ∈ Z`0q × Z`1q .
4. If MAC.Ver(kmac, (y, c0), c1) = 0, return ⊥. Otherwise, compute and output the plain-
text Msg = c0 − ksym ∈ Z`0q .
We note that, while the encryption algorithm requires to homomorphically compute λ cir-
cuits, these evaluations can take place in an off-line phase, where y0 and y are pre-computed
before knowing Msg.
In order to instantiate the scheme with a polynomial-size modulus q, we need a PRF with
an evaluation circuit in NC1, which translates into a polynomial-length branching program.
By applying Lemma 10 and exploiting the asymmetric noise growth of the GSW FHE as in
[31], we can indeed keep q small.
For this purpose, the Banerjee-Peikert PRF [5] is a suitable candidate. While its evalua-
tion circuit is in NC2 in general, we can still homomorphically evaluate input-dependent cir-
cuits CPRF,j(·) over the encrypted key K using an NC1 circuit. For public moduli p, q and ma-
trices A0,A1 ∈ Zn×ndlog qeq , their PRF maps an input x ∈ {0, 1}k to b(p/q) · (k> ·Ax mod q)c,
where k ∈ Znq is the secret key and the input-dependent matrix Ax is publicly computable
from A0,A1. This allows hard-coding Ax into an NC
1 circuit to be evaluated over the “en-
crypted” bits of k in order to obtain “encryptions” of the bits of b(p/q) · k> ·Axc. Indeed,
matrix-vector products and rounding can both be computed in TC0 ⊆ NC1, which allows
using a polynomial-size q by applying Lemma 10. The resulting instantiation relies on the
same LWE assumption as the Banerjee-Peikert PRF [5], where the modulus-to-noise ratio is
only slightly super-polynomial.
7 Note that y0 may be far from the image of A in an invalid ciphertext but the inversion algorithm can detect this
using ik′.
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4.2 Indistinguishability-Based (IND-SO-CCA2) Security
We first prove that the scheme provides IND-SO-CCA2 security. While we can tightly relate
the IND-SO-CCA security of the scheme to the pseudorandomness of the underlying PRF,
the reduction from the unforgeability of the MAC loses a factor proportional to the number
of challenges.
Theorem 3. The scheme provides IND-SO-CCA2 security assuming that: (i) ΠLTF is a
LTF; (ii) ΠABM is an ABM-LTF; (iii) PRF is a pseudorandom function family; (iv) MAC
provides sUF-OT-CMA security. In our instantiation, for any adversary A, there exists an
LWE`,m,q,χ distinguisher D1, a PRF adversary D2 and a MAC forger B with comparable
running time and such that
AdvIND-SO-CCA2A (λ) ≤ 4n ·Adv
D1,lwe
`,m,q,χ(λ) + 2 ·Adv
D2,prf
N+QD
(λ)
+
QD + 2 +N · (QD + 1)
2λ−2
+N ·Advmac,QDB (λ),
where N is the number of challenge ciphertexts and QD is the number of decryption queries
made by the adversary. (The proof is given in Appendix D.1.)
In Appendix C, we describe a variant of the scheme which, while not secure under selective
openings, can be proved tightly CCA2-secure in the multi-challenge setting (cf. Definition 5
in Appendix B.1) as long as the PRF is itself tightly secure. In order to enable instantiations
with a polynomial-size modulus q, we give a tighter security proof for the PRF of [25] in
Appendix F.
4.3 Achieving Simulation-Based (SIM-SO-CCA2) Security
We show that our scheme can be instantiated so as to achieve the stronger notion of SIM-
SO-CCA2 security. To this end, we show that it is in fact a lossy encryption scheme with
weak efficient opening. We first detail the lossy key generation algorithm (which can be used
in the final game in the proof of IND-SO-CCA2 security) and the Opener algorithm.
In order for Opener to run efficiently, we instantiate our scheme with a universal hash
family UH, where each function h : [−σx
√
n, σx
√
n]n → Z`0+`1q is keyed by a public matrix
HUH ∈ Z(`0+`1)×nq , which is included in the public key PKloss and allows evaluating
hHUH(x) =
[
ksym
kmac
]
= HUH · x mod q
before computing c0 = Msg + k
sym ∈ Z`0q and c1 = MAC.Sig(ksym, (y, c0)).
We also require Par-Gen to output public parameters `, `0, n satisfying the constraint
n > 2 · (2`+ `0 + `1) · log q, where `0 is the message length, `1 is the key length of the MAC
and ` is the dimension of the underlying LWE assumption.
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Keygen(Γ, loss): Given public parameters Γ = {`, `0, `1, n,m, q, β, σx, σe} containing inte-
gers `, `0, n,m such that n > 2 · (2` + `0 + `1) · dlog qe and m > 2(n + `) · log q, conduct
the following steps.
1. Choose a random matrix C0 ←↩ U
(
Zn̄×¯̀q
)
, where ¯̀= (2`+`0+`1) and n̄ = n− ¯̀·dlog qe
which is used to run the (C,Rsim) ← GenTrap(C0, I¯̀, σx) algorithm of Lemma 8 to
produce a statistically uniform C ∈ Z¯̀×nq with a a small-norm Rsim ∈ Z
¯̀·dlog qe×n̄
forming a Gsim-trapdoor, where Gsim ∈ Z
¯̀·dlog qe×¯̀
q is the gadget matrix of [69]. Parse
C ∈ Z¯̀×nq as
C =
CLTFCABM
HUH
 ∈ Z¯̀×nq , (4)
where CLTF,CABM ∈ Z`×nq and HUH ∈ Z
(`0+`1)×n
q .
2. Sample matrices BLTF ←↩ U(Z2m×`q ), BABM ←↩ U(Zm×`q ), FLTF ←↩ χ2m×n, FABM ←↩
χm×n in order to define
ALTF = BLTF ·CLTF + FLTF ∈ Z2m×nq
AABM = BABM ·CABM + FABM ∈ Zm×nq ,
which are statistically close to outputs of Lossy(1n, 1m, 1`, q, χ) as CLTF and CABM are
statistically uniform over Z`×nq .
3. Define ek′ = ALTF ∈ Z2m×nq to be the evaluation key of ΠLTF. Then, run Steps 2-4 of
the key generation algorithm of ΠABM while setting Ā = AABM ∈ Zm×nq at Step 1.
The resulting keys (ek, ik, tk) consist of
ek :=
(
AABM, {Bi}λi=1
)
, ik :=
(
{Ri}λi=1, K
)
, tk := K
and are statistically close to the output distribution (2) of ΠABM.Gen.
Return PKloss = (ek
′, ek,HUH) and
SKloss =
(
Rsim,C0,BLTF,BABM,FLTF,FABM, ik
)
. (5)
Opener(Γ, PKloss, SKloss,Msg0, (x, e0, e1),Msg1): Parse SKloss as in (5) and conduct the fol-
lowing steps.
1. Compute tLTF,x = CLTF · x ∈ Z`q, tABM,x = CABM · x ∈ Z`q and[
ksym,x
kmac,x
]
= HUH · x ∈ Z`0+`1q .
Then, set tMsg,x = (Msg0 −Msg1) + ksym,x ∈ Z`0q and define
tx =
[
t>LTF,x | t>ABM,x | t>Msg,x | kmac,x
> ]> ∈ Z¯̀q.
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2. Using the trapdoor Rsim ∈ Z
¯̀·dlog qe×n̄, sample a small-norm vector x′ ←↩ DSF,tx,f
Λ⊥(C)+z,
√
Σ,c
so as to have a short integer vector x′ ∈ Zn satisfying C · x′ = tx mod q, using an
arbitrary solution z ∈ Zn of C · z = tx ∈ Z
¯̀
q, where Σ and c are defined based on
Lemma 11, for
F :=
 FLTFFABM
Rt · FABM
 ∈ Z4m×n, e := [e0
e
]
∈ Z4m, f := F · x + e ∈ Z4m. (6)
3. Output (x′, e′0, e
′) where
e′0 = FLTF · (x− x′) + e0 ∈ Z2m
e′ =
[
FABM
Rt · FABM
]
· (x− x′) + e ∈ Z2m (7)
We observe that algorithm Opener is efficient. In particular, at Step 2, it can compute
the matrix Σ and the vector c of Lemma 11 by first reconstructing the matrix F ∈ Z4m×n of
(6) and the vector f = F · x + e ∈ Z4m, which requires to deterministically re-compute the
integer matrix Rt obtained at Step 2 of ABM.Invert(ik, t, .) using ik = ((Ri)i≤λ, K).
We easily check that, for any vector x′ sampled at Step 2, the corresponding[
ksym,x
′
kmac,x
′
]
= HUH · x′ ∈ Z`0+`1q
satisfy kmac,x
′
= kmac,x0 and ksym,x
′
= (Msg0 −Msg1) + ksym,x mod q.
As a consequence, if C = (tc, c0, c1,y0,y) ← Encrypt(PKloss,Msg0, (x, e0, e)), the ob-
tained ciphertext C contains
c0 = Msg0 + k
sym,x mod q, c1 = MAC.Sig(k
mac,x, (y, c0)),
which coincide with c0 = Msg1 + k
sym,x′ and c1 = MAC.Sig(k
mac,x′ , (y, c0)). Moreover, we
also have CLTF · x = CLTF · x′ and CABM · x = CABM · x′.
The following theorem formally states the correctness of the Opener algorithm.
Theorem 4. For any key pair (PKloss, SKloss) in the support of Keygen(Γ, loss), algorithm
Opener outputs (x′, e′0, e
′) with the correct distribution conditionally on
Encrypt(PKloss,,Msg0, (x, e0, e)) = Encrypt(PKloss,,Msg1, (x
′, e′0, e
′)).
Proof. For any lossy tag t = (tc, ta), the matrix At used by Π
ABM.Eval(ek, t, .) is of the form
At =
[
AABM
Rt ·AABM
]
=
[
BABM
Rt ·BABM
]
·CABM +
[
FABM
Rt · FABM
]
, (8)
where Rt ∈ Zm×m is the integer matrix obtained in ABM.Invert(ik, t, .). At the same time,
ek′ consists of a matrix of the form ALTF = BLTF ·CLTF + FLTF.
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We now claim that, due to the way to sample x′ at Step 2 of Opener and the definition
of e′0 and e
′ at Step 3, the distribution of y′0 and y
′, with{
y′0 = ALTF · x′ + e′0 ∈ Z2m
y′ = At · x′ + e′ ∈ Z2m
(9)
is the same as that of the real encryptions explained in the beginning of this Section. By
replacing ALTF,At and e
′
0 and e
′ we get:
y′0 = (BLTF ·CLTF + FLTF) · x′ + (FLTF · (x− x′) + e0)
= BLTF ·CLTF · x′ + FLTF · x + e0
= BLTF ·CLTF · x + FLTF · x + e0
= ALTF · x + e0 ∈ Zm
and
y′ =
([
BABM
Rt ·BABM
]
·CABM +
[
FABM
Rt · FABM
])
· x′
+
([
FABM
Rt · FABM
]
· (x− x′) + e
)
(10)
=
[
BABM
Rt ·BABM
]
·CABM · x′ +
[
FABM
Rt · FABM
]
· x + e
=
[
BABM
Rt ·BABM
]
·CABM · x +
[
FABM
Rt · FABM
]
· x + e
= At · x + e ∈ Z2m
It remains to show that (x′, e′0, e
′) have the correct distribution. Recall that x′ is sampled by
applying the second part of Theorem 1 at Step 2. By applying Lemma 11 to the matrix C
of (4) with u = tx, the conditional distribution of x
′ given (tx,F ·x + e) is statistically close
to D
SF,tx,f
Λ⊥(C)+z,
√
Σ,c
, where z is an arbitrary solution of C · z = tx. Since x′ can be efficiently
sampled by Theorem 1, this provides the claimed result. ut
In Appendix E, we show that lattice trapdoors can also be used to obtain SIM-SO-CPA
security from LTFs based on DDH-like assumptions.
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A Efficiency Improvements for the Scheme of Section 4 Using
MACs Instead of PRFs
The bottleneck of our constructions is the need to homomorphically evaluate O(λ) circuits
when evaluating the all-but-many function in the encryption and decryption algorithms.
In our ABM-LTF, the motivation for using a PRF was to prove the feasibility of tightly
CCA2-secure public-key encryption under lattice assumptions. In our SIM-SO-CCA2-secure
encryption scheme (which is not meant to be tightly secure), we can substantially improve
the efficiency by trading the PRF for a MAC in our ABM-LTF construction.
Concretely, we can have the matrices Bi = Ri · Ā + K[i] · G encrypt the bits of the
MAC secret key K ∈ {0, 1}λ and define lossy tags t = (tc, ta) to be those for which
MAC.Ver(K, ta, tc) = 1. At Step 1 of the evaluation algorithm ABM.Eval(ek, t, ·), we de-
fine C(tc, ta) : {0, 1}λ → {0, 1} to be the circuit, where (tc, ta) are hardwired, that outputs
1−MAC.Ver(K, ta, tc) ∈ {0, 1}. By doing so, we only need to evaluate one circuit.
In order to preserve the evasiveness property of the modified ABM-LTF, the MAC can be
randomized but has to be strongly unforgeable. As for the indistinguishability property, we
need the MAC to satisfy a stronger flavor of the notion of key-indistinguishability8 introduced
by Alwen et al. [3]. Namely, we need valid MACs to be computationally indistinguishable
from random elements of the ambient space Tc. If the MAC is both strongly unforgeable and
pseudorandom, everything goes through in the proofs of IND-SO-CCA2 and SIM-SO-CCA2
security with the modified ABM-LTF.
8 Key indistinguishability refers to the indistinguishability of two games. In the first one, the adversary has access
to MAC and verification oracles for two independent keys while, in the second game, the two oracles use the same
secret key.
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In [3, Section 3.2], Alwen et al. proved the key-indistinguishability of the LPN-based
MAC of [65] (of which LWE-based variants were described in [65, Appendix A.3]) by implic-
itly showing it pseudorandom (see [3, Theorem 2]). Moreover, they also showed that this
specific MAC can be made strongly unforgeable via a circuit-depth-preserving transforma-
tion due to Dodis et al. [39, Section 3.1], which maintains its pseudorandomness. Moreover,
the verification algorithm of the resulting MAC fits within an NC1 circuit as it basically
requires two matrix-vector products followed by a Hamming weight test.
B Definitions for Cryptographic Primitives
B.1 Public-Key Encryption in the Multi-Challenge Setting
Bellare, Boldyreva and Micali [8] considered the following security definition, which accounts
for multiple users and multiple challenge ciphertexts per user.
Definition 5. A public-key encryption scheme is (µ,QE, QD)-IND-CCA secure, for integers
µ,QE, QD, if no ppt adversary has noticeable advantage in this game:
1. The challenger first generates Γ ←↩ Par-Gen(1λ) and runs (SK(j), PK(j)) ←↩ Keygen(Γ )
for j ≤ µ. It gives (PK(j))j≤µ to the adversary A and retains (SK(j))j≤µ. In addition, the
challenger initializes a set Q ← ∅ and counters ie, id ← 0. Finally, it chooses a random
bit b←↩ U({0, 1}).
2. The adversary A adaptively makes queries to the following oracles on multiple occasions:
– Encryption query: A chooses an index j ≤ µ and a pair (Msg0,Msg1) of equal-
length messages; if ie = QE, the oracle returns ⊥; otherwise, it computes C ←↩
Encrypt(PK(j),Msgb) and returns C; in addition, it sets Q ← Q ∪ {(j, C)} and
ie ← ie + 1.
– Decryption query: A chooses an index j ≤ µ and an element C of the ciphertext
domain; if id = QD or (j, C) ∈ Q, the oracle returns ⊥; otherwise, the oracle returns
Msg ← Decrypt(SK(j), C), which may be ⊥ if C is an invalid ciphertext, and sets
id ← id + 1.
3. The adversary A outputs a bit b′ and is deemed successful if b′ = b. As usual, A’s advan-
tage is measured as the distance
AdvCCAµ,QE ,QD(λ) := |Pr[b
′ = b]− 1/2|.
Using the random self-reducibility property of DDH, well-known constructions (e.g., the
Cramer-Shoup encryption scheme [37]) were shown [8] to provide tight (poly, 1, poly)-IND-
CCA security. Hofheinz and Jager [61] gave the first tight security result in the most general
(poly, poly, poly) case. Here, we restrict ourselves to the single-user (1, poly, poly) setting, in
which we provide the first tight multi-challenge security results under lattice assumptions.
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B.2 One-Time Signatures, Message Authentication Codes and Pseudorandom
Functions
A one time signature is a tuple of efficient algorithms (G,S,V), where:
- G takes as input a security parameter 1λ and, optionally, a set of public parameters Γ .
It outputs a key pair (SVK, SSK)
- S is a possibly randomized algorithm that takes as input a message M and a secret key
SSK. It outputs a signature sig.
- V is a deterministic algorithm taking as input a verification key SVK, a message M and
a candidate signature sig. It outputs 1 or 0.
We consider a security definition in the multi-signer setting (see, e.g., [59]). Note that, while
security in the single-user setting implies security in the multi-user setting via a standard
hybrid argument, this argument is not tight as it incurs a linear security loss w.r.t. N .
Definition 6. A one-time signature (G, S,V) provides one-time strong unforgeability in the
multi-user setting if no ppt adversary has non-negligible advantage in the following game.
1. The challenger generates N key pairs (SVKi, SSKi) ← G(Γ, 1λ) and gives (SVKi)i≤N to
the adversary A.
2. The adversary adaptively makes up to N queries of the form (i,Mi). At each query, it
obtains sigi ← S(SSKi,Mi). Note that a single query is allowed for each index i ≤ N .
3. A outputs (i?,M?, sig?) and wins if V(SVKi? ,M?, sig?) = 1 and (M?, sig?) 6= (Mi? , sigi?).
The adversary’s advantage AdvA,suf-OTSN (λ) its probability of success taken over all random
coins.
A message authentication code (MAC) is a triple MAC = (KG, Sig,Ver) of efficient al-
gorithms which are associated with a key space K and a message space M. The syntax of
these algorithms is the following:
MAC.KG(1λ) takes as input a security parameter 1λ and outputs a random secret key k ∈ K.
MAC.Sig(k,M) is an algorithm taking as input a message M ∈M and a secret key k ∈ K.
It outputs an authentication value s← MAC.Sig(k,M).
MAC.Ver(k,M, s) is a deterministic algorithm that takes in a secret key k ∈ K, a message
M ∈M and a candidate MAC value s. It outputs 1 or 0.
Definition 7. A MAC is strongly one-time unforgeable under chosen-message attacks (sUF-
OT-CMA) if no ppt adversary has non-negligible advantage in the following game:
1. The challenger chooses a random key k ∈ K. The adversary A is run on input of the
security parameter 1λ.
2. Adversary A adaptively makes the following kinds of queries:
- MAC queries: A chooses an arbitrary message M ∈ M. The challenger computes
s← MAC.Sig(k,M) and returns σ.
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- Verification queries: A chooses an arbitrary pair (M, s). The challenger returns the
output of MAC.Ver(k,M, s) ∈ {0, 1} to A.
While A can make arbitrarily many verification queries, only one MAC query is allowed
and we call (M †, s†) the input-output pair of that query.
3. When A halts, it outputs a pair (M?, s?) and wins if the following conditions are satisfied:
(i) (M?, s?) 6= (M †, s†); (ii) MAC.Ver(k,M?, s?) = 1.
We define the adversary’s advantage AdvB,MACQV (λ) after QV verification queries as its prob-
ability of success taken over all random choices.
We will consider unique one-time MACs, where MAC.Sig does not use any random coins
and each message M has only one valid s. For example, any PRF is a unique MAC.
Definition 8. Let λ be a security parameter and let κ = κ(λ). A pseudorandom function
PRF : {0, 1}λ × {0, 1}κ → {0, 1}λ is an efficiently computable function where the first input
K ∈ {0, 1}λ is the key. Let Ω be the set of all functions that map κ-bit inputs to λ-bit strings.
The advantage of a PRF distinguisher D making Q evaluation queries is defined as
AdvD,prfQ (λ) := |Pr[D
PRF(K,·)(1λ) = 1]− Pr[DF (·)(1λ) = 1]|,
where the probability is taken over the random choice of K ←↩ U({0, 1}λ) and F ←↩ U(Ω)
and the coin tosses of D.
B.3 Definition of Indistinguishability-Based Selective Opening
Chosen-Ciphertext (IND-SO-CCA2) Security
It was shown [12, 17] that, for message distributions supporting efficient conditional re-
sampling, lossy trapdoor functions imply SOA security in the sense of an indistinguishability-
based definition.
Definition 9 ([57]). Let N = N(λ) and let M be a joint distribution over MsgSp(λ)N .
We say that M supports efficient conditional re-sampling if there is an efficient algorithm
ReSampM such that, for any I ⊆ [N ], and any set MsgI of pairs {(i,Msgi)}i∈I , with Msgi ∈
MsgSp(λ) for each i ∈ I, ReSampM(I,MsgI) samples from the distributionM by outputting
a N-vector Msg′ ∈ MsgSp(λ)N such that Msg′[i] = Msgi for each i ∈ I.
For such distributions, as in [57], we first aim at IND-SOA security under chosen-
ciphertext attacks: i.e., when the adversary is granted access to a decryption oracle.
Definition 10 ([53, 57]). A public-key encryption scheme (Par-Gen,Keygen,Encrypt,Decrypt)
provides indistinguishability-based selective-opening security under chosen-ciphertext attacks
(or IND-SO-CCA2 security) if, for any polynomial N ∈ poly(λ) and any message distribu-
tion M ∈ MsgSp(λ)N supporting efficient conditional re-sampling, no ppt adversary A has
non-negligible advantage in this game.
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1. The challenger flips a random coin b ←↩ U({0, 1}). It generates public parameters Γ ←
Par-Gen(1λ) with a key pair (SK,PK) ← Keygen(Γ ) and gives (Γ, PK) to A which
adaptively makes the following kinds of queries:
• Challenge Query: let M be a message sampler for MsgSp(λ). The challenger sam-
ples Msg = (Msg1, . . . ,MsgN)←M and returns N target ciphertexts
C = (C1, . . . ,CN)←
(
Encrypt(PK,Msg1, r1), . . . ,Encrypt(PK,MsgN , rN)
)
.
which are computed using independent random coins r1, . . . , rN ←↩ R.
• Corrupt Query: A chooses an arbitrary subset I ⊂ {1, . . . , N}. The challenger
then reveals {(Msgi, ri)}i∈I to A. As for indexes i ∈ [N ] \ I, the challenger does the
following:
- If b = 1, reveal {Msgj}j /∈I to A.
- In b = 0, re-sample (Msg′1, . . . ,Msg
′
N) ← ReSampM(I, {(i,Msgi)}i∈I) and return
the subset {Msg′j}j /∈I of re-sampled messages.
• Decryption Queries: A chooses a ciphertext C such that C 6= Ci for each i ∈ [N ]
and obtains Decrypt(SK,C) ∈ MsgSp(λ) ∪ {⊥}.
After polynomially-many decryption queries and exactly one challenge query followed by one
corruption query, A outputs a bit b′ ∈ {0, 1} and wins if b′ = b. Its advantage is defined as
the distance AdvIND-SO-CCA2A (λ) := |Pr[b′ = b]− 1/2|, where the probability is taken over all
coin tosses.
We insist that, in the above definition, the challenger is only efficient for distribu-
tions supporting efficient conditional resampling. It is known [63] that, under certain con-
ditions, standard security notions for public-key encryption do not imply security under
indistinguishability-based selective openings.
B.4 Lossy Encryption
In [12] Bellare, Hofheinz and Yilek defined the notion of lossy encryption. In short, a lossy
encryption scheme admits two computationally indistinguishable distributions of public keys.
On injective keys, the system behaves in the usual way whereas, for lossy public keys, ci-
phertexts are statistically independent of the message they encrypt. Yet, no ppt adversary
should be able to distinguish normal keys from lossy keys. It was proved in [12] that any
lossy encryption scheme provides IND-SO-CPA security.
Bellare et al. [12] also consider a property, called openability, which allows a possibly
inefficient algorithm Opener to open a ciphertext C generated under a lossy key to any
arbitrary plaintext Msg by outputting coins r ∈ R such that C = Encrypt(PK,Msg, r).
While lossy encryption is limited to provide IND-SO-CPA security, simulation-based security
is also achieved when Opener is a ppt algorithm. As pointed out in [17], a relaxed notion
of efficient openability (termed weak efficient openability by Hofheinz et al. [62]) suffices to
ensure SIM-SO-CPA security: in this relaxed flavor of openability, the Opener algorithm is
given access to the original message and random coins that were used to create the ciphertext,
which must now be opened to a different plaintext. Here, we adapt this definition to the case
of a non-uniform random coin distribution.
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Definition 11 ([12, 62]). A lossy PKE scheme with weak efficient opening consists of a
tuple (Par-Gen,Keygen,Encrypt,Decrypt) of efficient algorithms such that
– Keygen(Γ, inj) outputs injective keys (PKinj, SKinj).
– Keygen(Γ, loss) outputs keys (PKloss, SKloss), which are called lossy keys.
Moreover, these algorithms must satisfy the following properties:
1. For any public parameters Γ ← Par-Gen(1λ), if (PK, SK) ← Keygen(Γ, inj), for any
Msg ∈ MsgSp, we have Decrypt(SK,Encrypt(PK,Msg)) = Msg with overwhelming prob-
ability.
2. Lossy public keys are computationally indistinguishable from injective ones. Namely, for
any public parameters Γ ← Par-Gen(1λ), we have
{PK | (PK, SK)← Keygen(Γ, inj)} ≈c {PK | (PK, SK)← Keygen(Γ, loss)}
3. If Γ ← Par-Gen(1λ) and (PK, SK) ← Keygen(Γ, loss), then for any distinct messages
Msg0,Msg1 ∈ MsgSp, the two distributions
{C | C ← Encrypt(PKloss,Msg0)}, {C | C ← Encrypt(PKloss,Msg1)}
are statistically close.
4. Let DR denote the distribution of random coins input to Encrypt. For any message Msg ∈
MsgSp and ciphertext C, let DPK,Msg,C denote the probability distribution on randomness
space R with support
SPK,Msg,C = {R ∈ R : Encrypt(PK,Msg, R) = C},
and such that, for each R ∈ SPK,Msg,C, we have
DPK,Msg,C(R) = Pr
R′←↩DR
[R′ = R | Encrypt(PK,Msg, R′) = C].
There exists a ppt sampling algorithm Opener such that, given public parameters Γ ←
Par-Gen(1λ), lossy keys (PKloss, SKloss) ← Keygen(Γ, loss), random coins R ←↩ R and
any two messages Msg0,Msg1 ∈ MsgSp, outputs, with probability ≥ 1 − 2−Ω(λ) over
(SKloss, PKloss, R), an independent sample R from the distribution DPK,Msg1,C, where
C = Encrypt(PKloss,Msg0, R).
While weak efficient openability (i.e., property 4) is a weaker property than that of
efficient openability, it suffices to guarantee simulation-based selective opening security.
Lemma 17 ([12, 17]). Any lossy encryption scheme with efficient weak opening is SIM-
SO-CPA secure.
While the above result was only proved for chosen-plaintext adversaries, it carries over to
the chosen-ciphertext scenario. Namely, any IND-SO-CCA2 secure lossy encryption scheme
is also secure in the SIM-SO-CCA2 sense.
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C Tight Chosen-Ciphertext Security from LWE
Here, we combine our ABM-LTF and our LTF of Section 3 to obtain a public-key encryption
scheme whose chosen-ciphertext security in the multi-challenge setting tightly relates to the
LWE assumption if instantiated with a tightly secure LWE-based PRF.
The construction is similar to that of Section 4. The difference is that, instead of relying
on the hybrid encryption paradigm, it uses one-time signatures, which allows for a tight
reduction as we do not lose a factor QE (i.e., the number of queries to the encryption oracle)
w.r.t. the computational security of the MAC. Note that, in Section 4, we cannot rely on an
unconditionally secure one-time MAC since the MAC secret key would have to be longer than
the plaintext, which would not be compatible with the parameters of our Opener algorithm.
C.1 Description
We assume w.l.o.g. that the verification key SVK of the one-time signature fits within the
space of auxiliary tags of the ABM-LTF, since it can always be hashed for this purpose.
Par-Gen(1λ). Selects public parameters consisting of:
- A modulus q > 2, integers `, `0, n ∈ poly(λ), m = dcn · log qe, for some constant c > 0,
parameters σx, σe > 0, and an efficiently samplable LWE noise distribution.
- The specification Σ = (G,S,V) of a one-time signature.
- A family UH of universal hash functions h : [−σx
√
n, σx
√
n]n → Z`0q .
The public parameters Γ = {`, `0, n,m, q, σx, σe, χ,Σ,UH} define the plaintext space
MsgSp := Z`0q and will be shared by the LTF of Section 3.1 and the ABM-LTF of Sec-
tion 3.2.
Keygen(Γ ). Let ΠLTF = (IGen, LGen,Eval, Invert) be an instance of the LTF family of Section
3.1 and let ΠABM = (Gen,Eval, Invert, LTag) be an instance of the ABM-LTF family of
Section 3.2. We assume that functions ΠLTF and ΠABM operate over the common domain
DomDλ := {(x, e) ∈ Zn × Z2m | ‖x‖ ≤ σx ·
√
n, ‖e‖ ≤ σe ·
√
2m}.
The public key is generated via the following steps.
1. Generate (ek′, ik′) ←↩ ΠLTF.IGen(1λ) for an injective function of the LTF family to
obtain ek′ = A ∈ Z2m×nq and ik′ = R ∈ {−1, 1}m×m.
2. Generate (ek, ik, tk)←↩ ΠABM.Gen(1λ) to obtain ek = (Ā, (Bi)i≤λ) and ik = ((Ri)i≤λ, K).
3. Sample an element h←↩ U(UH) of the universal hash family.
Output (PK, SK) where the public key is PK =
(
ek′, ek, h
)
and the underlying private
key consists of SK = ik′.
Encrypt(PK,Msg). To encrypt Msg ∈ Z`0q , generate a key pair (SVK, SSK)←↩ G(1λ) and do
the following.
1. Sample (x, e0, e)←↩ DZn,σx ×DZ2m,σe ×DZ2m,σe .
2. Compute c0 = Msg + h(x) ∈ Z`0q .
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3. Compute y0 = Π
LTF.Eval(ek′, (x, e0)) = A · x + e0 ∈ Z2mq .
4. Define the auxiliary tag ta = SVK and choose a random tc ←↩ U(Tc). Let t = (tc, ta)
and compute y = ΠABM.Eval(ek, t, (x, e)) = At · x + e ∈ Z2mq .
5. Generate a one-time signature sig = S(SSK, (tc, c0,y0,y)).
Output the ciphertext C = (SVK, tc, c0,y0,y, sig).
Decrypt(SK,C). To decrypt C = (SVK, tc, c0,y0,y, sig) using SK = ik′,
1. If V(SVK, (tc, c0,y0,y), sig) = 0, return ⊥.
2. Compute (x, e0) ← ΠLTF.Invert(ik′,y0) and return ⊥ if y0 is not in the range of
ΠLTF.Eval(ek′, ·) or if (x, e0) 6∈ DomDλ .
3. Define the tag t = (tc, SVK). If ‖y −At · x0‖ > σe ·
√
2m, return ⊥.
4. Return Msg = c0 − h(x) ∈ Z`0q .
In order to instantiate the above construction with a polynomial-size modulus q, we need
a PRF that can be evaluated via an NC1 circuit – and thus a polynomial-length branching
program [7] – in order to apply Lemma 10. For this purpose, a tempting idea is to use
the PRF9 of Banerjee, Peikert and Rosen [6, Section 5], which has a tight reduction from
an LWE assumption. However, as mentioned in [6, Section 5.2], evaluating this function in
NC1 is possible when the key is fixed and hard-coded into the circuit. In our setting, the
input of the circuit should be the seed K – which is GSW-encrypted in the matrices {Bi}i≤λ
contained in ek – while it is the public string ta that can be hard-wired in the circuit to
be evaluated on the encrypted K ∈ {0, 1}. In this case, the construction of [6, Section 5.2]
seemingly requires an NC2 circuit.
Another PRF candidate is the key-homomorphic construction of Boneh et al. [25] as it is
easily computable in NC1 when the input is fixed. One hurdle is that the security proof of [25]
is not tight as it incurs a concrete security loss (i.e., the ratio between the advantages of the
adversary and the reduction) proportional to the number of evaluation queries. Fortunately,
in Appendix F, we give a tighter security proof which eliminates the multiplicative gap
proportional to the number of evaluation queries. This new proof thus allows instantiating
the above cryptosystem system with a polynomial-size modulus while retaining a tight proof
of CCA2 security (albeit under a strong LWE assumption).
C.2 Security
We show that the scheme provides almost tight (according to the terminology of [36]) CCA2
security in the multi-challenge setting (in the sense of Definition 5 in Appendix B.1) under the
LWE assumption. Namely, the security bound does not depend on the number QE of challenge
ciphertext obtained by the adversary. In order to avoid a degradation factor proportional to
the number of decryption queries (which appears in [57, Theorem 6.5]), the security proof
exploits the fact that our definition of evasiveness involves an ABM.IsLossy oracle to detect
when the adversary creates a breach in the evasiveness property. This saves the reduction
from losing a factor QD, where QD is the number of decryption queries.
9 This PRF maps inputs x ∈ {0, 1}κ to outputs b(p/q) ·A ·
∏κ
i=1 S
xi
i c, for secret matrices A ∈ Z
m×n
q and Si ∈ Zn×n
and prime moduli p < q.
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Theorem 5. The above scheme provides (1, QE, QD)-IND-CCA security assuming that: (i)
ΠLTF is an LTF; (ii) ΠABM is an ABM-LTF; (iii) PRF is a pseudo-random function family;
(iv) Σ is a strongly unforgeable one-time signature. In our instantiation, for any ppt adver-
sary A, there exists an LWE distinguisher D1, a PRF adversary D2 and a signature forger B
which all run in about the same time as A and such that
AdvA,CCA1,QE ,QD(λ) ≤ 4n ·Adv
D1,LWE
`,2m,q,χ(λ) + 2 ·Adv
D2,PRF
QE+QD
(λ)
+ AdvB,suf-OTSQE +
QD +QE + 2
2λ−1
. (11)
To properly instantiate the above construction, we need a lattice-based one-time signature
with a tight security proof in the multi-user setting (as defined in Appendix B.2) as the
adversary can see signatures for up to QE verification keys in the proof of Theorem 5. We
provide a simple example in Appendix C.3.
Proof (of Theorem 5). The proof proceeds with a sequence of games. For each i, we let Si
denote the event that the adversary A wins (by outputting b′ ∈ {0, 1} such that b′ = b) in
Game i.
Game 0: This is the real game. It begins with the challenger B choosing a bit b←↩ U({0, 1})
and generating PK = (ek′, ek, h) while keeping SK = (ik, ik′) to itself. We may assume
w.l.o.g. that the auxiliary tags ta = SVK
(i) of all challenge ciphertexts are chosen at the very
beginning of the game. At the outset of the game, B thus samples
(x(1), e
(1)
0 , e
(1)), . . . , (x(QE), e
(QE)
0 , e
(QE))←↩ DZn,σx ×DZ2m,σe ×DZ2m,σe .
For each i ∈ [QE], it then computes y(i)0 = ΠLTF.Eval(ek′, (x(i), e(i))) and ksym,(i) = h(x(i)).
It also defines t
(i)
a = SVK
(i), defines t(i) = (t
(i)
c , t
(i)
a ) for a random core tag t
(i)
c ←↩ U(Tc) and
computes y(i) = ΠABM.Eval
(
ek, t(i), (x(i), e(i))
)
.
At each encryption query
(
Msg
(i)
0 ,Msg
(i)
1
)
, the adversary obtains an encryption of Msg
(i)
b .
We denote by C(i) = (SVK(i), t
(i)
c , c
(i)
0 ,y
(i)
0 ,y
(i), sig(i)) the i-th challenge ciphertext, which is
obtained as
c
(i)
0 = Msg
(i)
b + k
sym,(i) mod q
y
(i)
0 = Π
LTF.Eval
(
ek′, (x(i), e
(i)
0 )
)
y(i) = ΠABM.Eval
(
ek, t(i), (x(i), e(i))
)
.
All decryption queries are answered using the inversion trapdoor ik′ of ΠLTF. When A halts,
it outputs a bit b′ ∈ {0, 1} and we call S0 the event that b′ = b.
Game 1: In this game, B rejects all decryption queries C = (SVK, tc, c0,y0,y, sig) such that
SVK = SVK(i) for some i ∈ [QE]. It is easy to see that, if Σ is a strongly unforgeable one-time
signature, B does not reject any ciphertext that it would not also reject in Game 0. We have
|Pr[S1]− Pr[S0]| ≤ Advsuf-ots(λ).
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Game 2: We modify the encryption oracle. At each encryption query (Msg
(i)
0 ,Msg
(i)
1 ), the
challenger encrypts C(i) = (SVK(i), t
(i)
c , c
(i)
0 ,y
(i)
0 ,y
(i), sig(i)) on a lossy tag t(i) = (t
(i)
c , SVK
(i)).
In the instantiation based on our ABM-LTF, this implies that the core tag component t
(i)
c
is computed as a pseudo-random function t
(i)
c = PRF(K, t
(i)
a ) of the auxiliary tag component
t
(i)
a = SVK
(i) at the beginning of the game. The indistinguishability property of our ABM-
LTF ensures that this change will not noticeably increase A’s probability Pr[S2] of success.
We have |Pr[S2] − Pr[S1]| ≤ 2n · AdvD1,lwe`,m,q,χ(λ) + Adv
D2,prf
QE
(λ) + 1
2λ−1
, for some efficient
distinguishers D1 and D2.
Game 3: In this game, we modify the decryption oracle. Namely, at each decryption query
C = (SVK, tc, c0,y0,y, sig), B still rejects C if SVK ∈ {SVK(1), . . . , SVK(QE)}. However, it
also rejects C in the event that SVK 6∈ {SVK(1), . . . , SVK(QE)} but the corresponding tag
t =
(
tc, SVK
)
is a lossy tag. Clearly, Game 4 is identical to Game 3 until the event F3 that B
rejects a ciphertext that would not have been rejected in Game 3. In this case, A manages
to break the evasiveness property of our ABM-LTF.
We claim that Pr[F3] ≤ AdvA,evaQE ,QD(λ). To see this, we describe an evasiveness adversary B
with advantage Pr[F3]. Concretely, B interacts with an evasiveness challenger that provides it
with an evaluation key ek and oracles ABM.LTag(tk, .) and ABM.IsLossy(tk, .). The adversary
is run on input of the public encryption key PK =
(
ek′, ek, h
)
where the evaluation key ek′
of ΠLTF is obtained by generating (ek′, ik′) ← ΠLTF.IGen(1λ). At the i-th encryption query
(Msg
(i)
0 ,Msg
(i)
1 ) made by A during the game, D defines t
(i)
a = SVK
(i), which it queries to its
ABM.LTag(tk, .) oracle and obtains t
(i)
c ∈ {0, 1}λ. Next, B fetches (x(i), e(i)0 , e(i)) and computes
y
(i)
0 = Π
LTF.Eval(ek′, (x(i), e
(i)
0 )) as well as y
(i) = ΠABM.Eval(ek, t(i), (x(i), e(i))), where t(i) =
(t
(i)
c , SVK
(i)). Then, it returns the ciphertext C(i) = (SVK(i), t
(i)
c , c
(i)
0 ,y
(i)
0 ,y
(i), sig(i)) to A.
At each decryption query C = (SVK, tc, c0,y0,y, sig), our evasiveness adversary B queries
its ABM.IsLossy(tk, .) oracle on the input (tc,y0). If the response is 1, then B halts and outputs
(tc, SVK). Otherwise, B continues and uses the LTF inversion key ik′ – which it knows from
the key generation phase – to faithfully run the real decryption algorithm. If B did not halt by
the time A terminates, it aborts. It is easy to see that B succeeds in breaking the evasiveness
with probability Pr[F3]. This yields the announced lower bound Adv
A,eva
QE ,QD
(λ) ≥ Pr[F3].
Using our concrete LWE-based ABM-LTF, the result of Lemma 13 implies the inequality
|Pr[S3]− Pr[S2]| ≤ Pr[F3] ≤ n ·AdvD1,lwe`,m,q,χ(λ) + Adv
D2,prf
QE+QD
(λ) +
QD + 1
2λ
.
In subsequent games, we do not rely on the pseudo-randomness of the PRF any more and
we can henceforth explicitly use its seed K to detect lossy tags when they show up.
Game 4: In this game, we modify again the decryption oracle. In this game, we do no longer
use the inversion trapdoor ik′ of ΠLTF but rather use the trapdoor ik of the ABM-LTF
function ΠABM. At each decryption query C = (SVK, tc, c0,y0,y, sig), B still rejects C – as
in Game 3 – in the event that SVK 6∈ {SVK(1), . . . , SVK(QE)} and t = (tc, SVK) is a lossy
tag. Otherwise the tag t = (tc, SVK) must be injective. This allows B to compute the pre-
image (x, e) = ΠABM.Invert(ik, t,y). Having obtained (x, e), B returns ⊥ if (x, e) 6∈ DomDλ or
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‖y0−A · x‖ > σe
√
2m. Otherwise, it computes ksym = h(x) and returns Msg = c0− ksym ∈
Z`0q . It is easy to see that the adversary’s view is the same as in Game 3 since B does not reject
any ciphertext that would not have been rejected in Game 3. We thus have Pr[S4] = Pr[S3].
Game 5: In this game, we modify the key generation phase. Instead of choosing the eval-
uation/inversion keys (ek′, ik′) ← ΠLTF.IGen(1λ) as in an injective function, D generates
(ek′,⊥)← ΠLTF.LGen(1λ) as the evaluation key of a lossy function. By the properties of the
lossy trapdoor function of Section 3.1, we know that this change will not be noticeable to A
under the LWE assumption. We have
|Pr[S5]− Pr[S4]| ≤ AdvA,LTF,ind(λ) ≤ n ·AdvlweLTF,D(λ).
Game 6: We modify the preparation stage of the challenger. Instead of deriving the sym-
metric encryption keys ksym,(i) = h(x(i)) for each i ∈ [QE], B samples them as uniformly
random one-time keys ksym,(i) ←↩ U(Z`0q ) for each i ∈ [QE].
We claim that this change leaves A’s view statistically unchanged. Indeed, for lossy tags
t(i) = (t
(i)
c , SVK
(i)), conditionally on
y
(i)
0 = Π
LTF.Eval
(
ek′, (x(i), e
(i)
0 )
)
, y(i) = ΠABM.Eval
(
ek, t(i), (x(i), e(i))
)
,
the input x(i) retains at least n bits of min-entropy. More precisely, Lemma 16 implies
H∞(x
(i) | ek, ek′,y0,y)≥ n · log σx − 2− ` · log q > Ω(n · log n) (12)
Lemma 1 implies that we can bound the statistical distance as
∆
(
(ek, ek′, t(i),y
(i)
0 ,y
(i), h(x(i))), (ek, ek′, t(i),y
(i)
0 ,y
(i), U(Z`0q ))
)
≤ 1
2(n·log σx−(`+`0)·log q)/2
which is smaller than 2−λ as long as n · log σx is sufficiently large. By repeating the same
argument for each challenge ciphertext, we obtain |Pr[S6]− Pr[S5]| ≤ QE/2λ.
In Game 6, we finally remark that c
(i)
0 = Msg
(i)
b + k
sym,(i) ∈ Z`0q perfectly hide the
underlying messages in all encryption queries since the one-time symmetric keys act as one-
time pads. We conclude that b ∈ {0, 1} is independent of A’s view, so that Pr[S6] = 1/2. ut
C.3 Tightly Secure One-Time Signatures from the SIS Assumption
In this section, we describe a one-time signature with a tight security proof under the SIS
assumption in the multi-user setting.
Definition 12. Let m,n, q, β be functions of a parameter 1λ. The Short Integer Solution
problem SISm,q,β is as follows: Given A ←↩ U(Zm×nq ), find a non-zero x ∈ Zm such that
x> ·A = 01×n and 0 < ‖x‖ ≤ β.
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Tightly secure signatures based on the SIS assumption (and hence the LWE assumption)
were previously described [19] in the single-user setting. In the multi-user setting, we give a
simple construction, which is inspired from a SIS-based signature due to Böhl et al. [20]. In
particular, it combines a weakly secure one-time signature (i.e., which is only secure against
non-adaptive attacks, where the adversary chooses the messages to be signed before seeing
the public key) with a chameleon hash function suggested in [35].
We assume public parameters Γ which contain random matrices A0 ←↩ U(Zm/2×nq ),
B0,B1 ←↩ U(Zm×nq ) and D←↩ U(Zk×nq ), where m > 4n log q and k = ndlog qe.
G(Γ, 1λ): Run (A,R) ← GenTrap(A0, In, γ) and choose u ←↩ U(Znq ). Output (SVK, SSK),
where SVK = (A,u) ∈ Zm×nq × Znq and SSK = R ∈ Zm/2×m/2.
S(SSK,m): To sign m ∈ {0, 1}m, using SSK = R, do the following:
1. Compute a chameleon hash c>M = m
> · B0 + r>B1 mod q, using a short Gaussian
vector r←↩ DZm,γ.
2. Define u>M = u
> + g−1(cM)
> · D mod q, where g−1(cM) ∈ {0, 1}k is the binary de-
composition of cM ∈ Znq .
3. Using SSK = R, sample v ←↩ DΛuMq (A),γ to obtain a v ∈ Z
m such that ‖v‖2 ≤ γ
√
m
and
v> ·A = u> + g−1
(
m> ·B0 + r> ·B1
)> ·D mod q (13)
and output sig = (r,v) ∈ Zm × Zm.
V(SVK,m, sig = (r,v)): Given a candidate signature sig = (r,v) and m ∈ {0, 1}m, return
1 if and only if ‖r‖2 ≤ γ
√
m, ‖v‖2 ≤ γ
√
m and equality (13) is satisfied.
One disadvantage of the above construction is its long public key, which contains A ∈
Zm×nq . In our CCA2-secure encryption scheme, it requires to introduce a full n ×m matrix
in the ciphertext. Ideally, one would clearly prefer verification keys SVK that live in Znq .
In standard lattices, however, we are not aware of any one-time signature with O(n)-size
verification key, let alone with tight security. We leave it as an interesting open problem.
Theorem 6. The above one-time signature is tightly secure under the SIS assumption.
Proof. Assuming a forger A against the signature scheme in the game of Definition 6, we
build a SIS solver B which takes as input a matrix Ā ∈ Zm×nq and finds an integer vector
e ∈ Zm of Λ⊥q (Ā) of norm ‖e‖2 ≤ β.
The reduction distinguishes two kinds of attacks.
Type I attacks: The adversary outputs (i?,m?, sig? = (r?,v?)) such that
m?> ·B0 + r?> ·B1 = m(i
?)> ·B0 + r(i
?)> ·B1 mod q,
where
(
m(i
?), sig(i
?) = (r(i
?),v(i
?)
)
denotes the message-signature pair obtained by A for
SVK(i
?) = (A(i
?),u(i
?)).
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Type II attacks: The adversary outputs (i?,m?, sig? = (r?,v?)) such that
m?> ·B0 + r?> ·B1 6= m(i
?)> ·B0 + r(i
?)> ·B1 mod q. (14)
Type I attacks yield a collision on the chameleon hash function, which has a tight security
proof under SIS assumption [35]. We thus focus on Type II forgeries.
In order to build public parameters andN verification keys SVKi =
(
Ai,ui), the reduction
B first samples a random matrix RD ←↩ U({−1, 1}k×m) and computes D = RD · Ā ∈ Zk×nq .
It also chooses B0 ←↩ U(Zm×nq ) at random and generates B1 ∈ Zm×nq as a statistically
uniform matrix for which it knows a trapdoor TB1 . For each i ∈ [N ], B generates the i-th
verification key SVKi by sampling Ri ←↩ U({−1, 1}m×m), vi ←↩ DZm,γ, hi ←↩ U(Znq ). It sets
Ai = Ri ·Ā ∈ Zm×nq and u>i = v>i ·Ai−g−1(hi)> ·D mod q. The public keys SVKi = (Ai,ui)
are given to the adversary A.
When A makes a signing query (i,mi), B uses the trapdoor TB1 to sample a vector
ri ∈ Zm of norm ‖ri‖2 ≤ γ
√
m such that r>i ·B1 = hi−m>i ·B0 mod q and returns (vi, ri).
By hypothesis, A outputs (i?,m?, sig? = (r?,v?)) satisfying (14) Due to the injectivity of
g−1(·), we know that
g−1(hi?) 6= g−1(m?> ·B0 + r?> ·B1),
Since the verification equation v?> ·Ai? = u>i + g−1(m?> ·B0 + r?> ·B1)> ·D can be written
v?> ·Ri? · Ā =
(
v>i ·Ri? − g−1(hi?)> ·RD
)
· Ā
+ g−1(m?> ·B0 + r?> ·B1) ·RD · Ā, (15)
we obtain
(v? − vi)> ·Ri? · Ā =
(
g−1(m?> ·B0 + r?> ·B1)− g−1(hi?)
)
·RD · Ā,
so that
w> = (v? − vi)> ·Ri? +
(
g−1(hi?)− g−1(m?> ·B0 + r?> ·B1)
)
·RD ∈ Z1×m
is in Λ⊥(Ā) and has norm ‖w‖2 ≤ m(1 + 2γ). Moreover, we argue that it is non-zero w.h.p.
Since g−1(hi?) 6= g−1(m?> · B0 + r?> · B1), we must have v? 6= vi over Z unless the row
vector (
g−1(m?> ·B0 + r?> ·B1)− g−1(hi?)
)
·RD
is itself a non-zero vector of Λ⊥(Ā). Since each row of Ri? ∈ {−1, 1}m×m has at least
m − n log q > m/2 bits of min-entropy conditionally on Ai? = Ri? · Ā, each coordinate of
(v? − vi)> ·Ri? is statistically unpredictable from A’s view and we can only have w = 0m
with probability smaller than 2−n. ut
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D Deferred Proofs for the Scheme in Section 4
D.1 Proof of Theorem 3
Proof. The proof proceeds with a sequence of games. For each i, we denote by Si the event
that the adversary A wins (by outputting b′ ∈ {0, 1} such that b′ = b) in Game i.
Game 0: This is the real game. It begins with the challenger B choosing a bit b←↩ U({0, 1})
and generating PK = (ek′, ek, h) while keeping SK = (ik, ik′) to itself. Before starting its
interaction with A, B samples
(x(1), e
(1)
0 , e
(1)), . . . , (x(N), e
(N)
0 , e
(N))←↩ DZn,σx ×DZ2m,σe ×DZ2m,σe .
For each i ∈ [N ], it computes y(i)0 = ΠLTF.Eval(ek′, (x(i), e
(i)
0 )) and derives symmetric keys
(ksym,(i),kmac,(i)) = h(x(i)). Next, it defines t
(i)
a = y
(i)
0 and t
(i) = (t
(i)
c , t
(i)
a ) for a randomly
chosen core tag t
(i)
c ←↩ U(Tc) before computing y(i) = ΠABM.Eval
(
ek, t(i),x(i)
)
.
In response to its challenge query, the adversary A obtains encryptions (C1, . . . ,CN) of
messages Msg = (Msg1, . . . ,MsgN)←M, where each ciphertext Ci = (t
(i)
c , c
(i)
0 , c
(i)
1 ,y
(i)
0 ,y
(i))
is obtained as
c
(i)
0 = Msgi + k
sym,(i) mod q, y
(i)
0 = Π
LTF.Eval
(
ek′, (x(i), e
(i)
0
)
y(i) = ΠABM.Eval
(
ek, t(i), (x(i), e(i))
)
, c
(i)
1 = MAC.Sig(k
mac,(i), (y(i), c
(i)
0 ))
Then, A chooses a subset I ⊂ [N ] for which it receives {(Msgi,y(i))}i∈I . At this point, the
challenger D re-samples
(Msg′1, . . . ,Msg
′
N)←↩ ReSampM(I, {(i,Msgi)}i∈I).
If b = 1, D reveals the real messages {Msgi}[n]\I to A. If b = 0, it rather returns {Msg′i}[n]\I
to A. All decryption queries are answered using the inversion trapdoor ik′ of ΠLTF. When
A terminates, it outputs a bit b ∈ {0, 1}. If we call S0 the event that b′ = b, we have
AdvIND-SO-CCA2A (λ) := |Pr[S0]− 1/2|.
Game 1: We modify the generation of the challenge ciphertexts (C1, . . . ,CN). For each
i ∈ [N ], the challenger B encrypts Ci = (t(i)c , c(i)0 , c
(i)
1 ,y
(i)
0 ,y
(i)) on a lossy tag t(i) = (t
(i)
c , t
(i)
a ).
In the instantiation based on our ABM-LTF, t
(i)
c is thus computed as a pseudo-random
function t
(i)
c = PRF(K, t
(i)
a ). The indistinguishability of our ABM-LTF ensures that Pr[S1]
remains negligibly far apart from Pr[S0]. There exist efficient distinguishers D1 and D2 such
that |Pr[S1]− Pr[S0]| ≤ 2n ·AdvD1,lwe`,m,q,χ(λ) + Adv
D2,prf
QE
(λ) + 1
2λ−1
.
Game 2: We modify the decryption oracle. At each decryption query C = (tc, c0, c1,y0,y),
B rejects C if the corresponding tag t =
(
tc,y0
)
is a lossy tag but y0 6∈ {y(1)0 , . . . ,y
(N)
0 }.
Game 2 is identical to Game 1 until the event F2 that B rejects a ciphertext that would have
deemed valid in Game 1. This event would break the evasiveness property of our ABM-LTF.
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Indeed, the same argument as in the proof of Theorem 5 shows that any evasiveness
adversary implies either an LWE`,m,q,χ distinguisher D1 or a PRF adversary D2 with non-
negligible advantage after N +QD evaluation queries. Lemma 13 implies
|Pr[S2]− Pr[S1]| ≤ Pr[F2] ≤ n ·AdvD1,lwe`,m,q,χ(λ) + Adv
D2,prf
N+QD
(λ) +
QD + 1
2λ
.
From here on, we are done with relying on the pseudo-randomness of the PRF and we
thus explicitly use the seed K in subsequent games.
Game 3: In this game, we do not use the inversion trapdoor ik′ of ΠLTF any longer but
rather use the trapdoor ik of ΠABM to answer decryption queries. For each decryption query
C = (tc, c0, c1,y0,y), B aborts (as in Game 2) if y0 6∈ {y(1)0 , . . . ,y
(N)
0 } and t = (tc,y0) is a
lossy tag. Otherwise, B distinguishes three kinds of queries:
a. If y0 6∈ {y(1)0 , . . . ,y
(N)
0 }, the tag t = (tc,y0) is injective as C would have been rejected
otherwise. This allows B to compute (x, e) = ΠABM.Invert(ik, t,y) and return ⊥ in the
following situations:
- y is not in the range of ΠABM.Eval(ek, t, .);
- (x, e) 6∈ DomDλ ;
- ‖y0 −A · x‖ > σe
√
2m.
If none of the above rejection rules applies, B derives (ksym,kmac) = h(x) and returns ⊥
if MAC.Ver(kmac, (y, c0), c1) = 0. If the MAC verifies, it returns Msg = c0 − ksym ∈ Z`0q .
b. If y0 = y
(i)
0 , for some i ∈ [N ], but tc 6= t
(i)
c , the tag t = (tc,y
(i)
0 ) is also injective since t
(i)
c
is the only core tag that makes t = (t
(i)
c ,y
(i)
0 ) lossy. This allows B to proceed by running
ΠABM.Invert(ik, t, .) as in the previous case.
c. If there is an index i ∈ [N ] such that y0 = y(i)0 and tc = t
(i)
c , B recalls the input x(i)
that was chosen in the preparation phase and returns ⊥ if ‖y − At · x(i)‖ > σe
√
2m.
Otherwise, it recalls the symmetric key (ksym,(i),kmac,(i)) = h(x(i)) that were derived
from x(i). As in Steps 3-4 of the actual decryption algorithm, B returns the plaintext
Msg = c0 − ksym,(i) ∈ Z`0q if MAC.Ver(kmac,(i), (y, c0), c1) = 1 and ⊥ otherwise.
By inspection, it is easy to see that A’s view is exactly as in Game 2, so that Pr[S3] = Pr[S2].
Game 4: We modify the key generation phase and replace ek′ by the evaluation key of a
lossy function. Instead of generating (ek′, ik′) ← ΠLTF.IGen(1λ) as an injective function, D
chooses it as (ek′,⊥) ← ΠLTF.LGen(1λ). Since the inversion key ik′ of ΠLTF was not used
in Game 4, this change will not be noticeable to A under the LWE assumption. We have
|Pr[S5]− Pr[S4]| ≤ n ·Advlwe(λ).
For all indexes i ∈ [N ], due to the lossiness of all challenge ciphertexts, Lemma 16 tell
us that
H∞(x
(i) | ek, ek′,y(i)0 ,y(i)) ≥ n · log σx − 2− ` · log q ≥ Ω(n · log n), (16)
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By Lemma 1, this implies
∆
(
(ek, ek′, t(i),y
(i)
0 ,y
(i), h(x(i))), (ek, ek′, t(i),y
(i)
0 ,y
(i), U(Z`0q × Z`1q ))
)
≤ 1
2(n·log σx−(`+`0+`1)·log q)/2
(17)
which is smaller than 2−λ when n · log σx is sufficiently large.
Game 5: We change the treatment of decryption queries C = (tc, c0, c1,y0,y) corresponding
to cases a or b of Game 3. In both cases, B can compute (x, e) = ΠABM.Invert(ik, t,y) since
the tag t = (tc,y0) is injective. The modification is that B now rejects C if x = x(i) for some
i ∈ [N ]. We claim that, except with negligible probability, B does not reject any ciphertext
that would not be rejected in Game 4.
To see this, we note that, for lossy tags t(i),
y
(i)
0 = Π
LTF.Eval
(
ek′, (x(i), e
(i)
0 )
)
, y(i) = ΠABM.Eval
(
ek, t(i), (x(i), e(i))
)
jointly leak a limited number bits about x(i), which retains at least λ bits of min-entropy
due to (16). Taking a union bound over all decryption queries and all indices i ∈ [N ], the
probability to reject a ciphertext that would not be rejected in Game 4 is at most QD ·N/2λ,
which implies |Pr[S5]− Pr[S4]| ≤ QD ·N/2λ.
Game 6: We modify the decryption oracle and let B reject all potentially harmful decryption
queries, which could possibly reveal h(x(i)) for unopened ciphertexts. Namely, the challenger
B introduces two rejection rules:
A. It rejects queries (t
(i)
c , c
(i)
0 , c1,y
(i)
0 ,y
(i)) such that c1 6= c(i)1 , for some i ∈ [N ].
B. It rejects all decryption queries of the form (t
(i)
c , c0, c1,y
(i)
0 ,y), for some i ∈ [N ], such that
(y, c0) 6= (y(i), c(i)0 ) and which either
- involve the index i ∈ [N ] \ I of an unopened ciphertext Ci after the corruption query;
- occur between the challenge query and the corruption query (and thus before the
adversary obtains the random coins of Ci).
Due to the uniqueness property of the MAC, we easily see that rule A does not change
anything to the adversary’s view. So, Game 6 only departs from Game 5 when rule B rejects
a ciphertext that would not be rejected in Game 5. If we call F6 the latter event, Lemma
shows that Pr[F6] ≤ N ·
(
Advmac,QDB (λ) +
1
2λ
)
.
In Game 6, we argue that Pr[S6] = 1/2 + N/2
λ, so that the adversary’s advantage
is statistically negligible. For each decryption query of the form (t
(i)
c , c0, c1,y
(i)
0 ,y), with
(y, c0) 6= (y(i), c(i)0 ) and for some i ∈ [N ]\I, the decryption oracle returns⊥. As for decryption
queries (tc, c
(i)
0 , c1,y
(i)
0 ,y
(i)) such that tc 6= t(i)c , they are also rejected when the inversion
algorithm ΠABM.Invert(tk, (tc,y
(i)
0 ),y
(i)) outputs (x(i), ·) due to the change introduced in
Game 5. For all unopened ciphertexts {Ci}i∈[N ]\I , A never tricks the decryption oracle into
revealing h(x(i)). Conditionally on the adversary’s view, {ksym,(i)}i∈[N ]\I are thus within
distance 2−λ from the uniform distribution U(Z`0q ) and they statistically hide {Msgi}i∈[N ]\I .
We conclude that b ∈ {0, 1} is statistically independent of A’s view, as claimed. ut
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Lemma 18. In Game 6, event F6 occurs with negligible probability if MAC is a strongly
secure one-time MAC. We have Pr[F6] ≤ N ·
(
Advmac,QDB (λ) +
1
2λ
)
, where Advmac,QDB (λ)
denotes B’s probability to break the strong unforgeability of the MAC after QD verification
queries.
Proof. By hypothesis, we know that, at some point of Game 6, rule B will cause B to reject
a ciphertext C =
(
t
(i)
c , c0, c1,y
(i)
0 ,y
(i)
)
that would not have been rejected in Game 5. We
build a MAC forger B with advantage (Pr[F6]− 2−λ)/N .
To this end, we need to consider two modifications of Game 6, which we call Game 6.1
and Game 6.2.
Game 6.1: This game is like Game 6 except that the challenger B randomly chooses i? ←↩
U([N ]) as a prediction that event F6 will occur for the i
?-th challenge ciphertext Ci? . If
A decides to open Ci? , B aborts since its guess i? ∈ [N ] turns out to be wrong. If the
first application of rule B involves an index i 6= i?, B also aborts for the same reason.
Otherwise, rule B applies for the first time for the index i?. If we call F6.1 this event, we
have Pr[F6.1] ≥ Pr[F6]/N since i? was chosen independently of A’s view.
Game 6.2: We modify the preparation phase and replace the i?-th MAC key kmac,(i
?) by a
uniformly random key kmac,? ←↩ U(Z`1q ). Since kmac,(i
?) is statistically close to the uniform
distribution for any unopened ciphertext, (17) implies |Pr[F6.2] − Pr[F6.1]| ≤ 2−λ if F6.2
denotes the counterpart of event F6.1 in Game 6.2.
In Game 6.2, we can turn B into a MAC forger such that Pr[F6.2] ≥ Advmac,QDB (λ).
This forger proceeds by initially choosing i? ←↩ U([N ]) as a predication of the index for
which event F6 will occur for the first time. It implicitly defines the i
?-th MAC secret key
kmac,(i
?) to be the key kmac,? of its MAC challenger. The remaining MAC keys {kmac,(i)}i 6=i?
are chosen by computing (ksym,(i),kmac,(i)) = h(x(i)) as in Game 6. In the challenge phase, B
generates (t
(i)
c , c
(i)
0 ,y
(i)
0 ,y
(i)), where c
(i)
0 = Msgi+k
sym,(i) ∈ Z`0q , as in Game 6. The generation
of c
(i)
1 depends on the index i ∈ [N ] of the challenge ciphertext:
- If i 6= i?, B computes c(i)1 = MAC.Sig
(
kmac,(i), (y0, c
(i)
0 )
)
itself.
- If i = i?, B obtains c(i
?)
1 = MAC.Sig
(
kmac,?, (y(i
?), c
(i?)
0 )
)
from its MAC challenger.
In either case, B sets Ci =
(
t
(i)
c , c
(i)
0 , c
(i)
1 ,y
(i)
0 ,y
(i)
)
to A.
At each decryption query of the form C =
(
t
(i)
c , c0, c1,y
(i)
0 ,y
)
for some i ∈ [N ], B queries
the verification of ((y, c0), c1) to its MAC challenger. If the response is 1, B aborts if i 6= i?.
Otherwise (i.e., if i = i?), B outputs ((y, c0), c1) and wins the game of Definition 7.
Since the choice of i? ∈ [QE] is independent of A’s view, we immediately obtain the
claimed lower bound on B’s advantage as a MAC forger. ut
E SIM-SO-CPA Security from DDH-based Lossy Trapdoor
Functions
In this section, we show that lossy trapdoor functions based on the Decision Diffie-Hellman
assumption (or, more generally, the matrix Diffie-Hellman assumption [43]) imply lossy en-
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cryption schemes [17] which can be instantiated so as to admit an efficient opening algorithm.
This provides evidence that, in the DDH setting, lossy trapdoor functions can also provide
simulation-based selective opening security.
We illustrate this with the LTF of Freeman et al. [45], modulo a slight modification in
its specification.
Definition 13. Let k, ` ∈ N with ` > k. We call D`,k a matrix distribution if it outputs
matrices in Z`×kq of full rank k in polynomial time.
We assume w.l.o.g. that the first k rows of A←↩ U(D`,k) form an invertible matrix over Zq.
In discrete-logarithm-hard groups, we rely on the matrix Diffie-Hellman assumption [43],
which posits the infeasibility of distinguishing full-rank matrices from lower-rank matrices
when they are given in the exponent.
Definition 14 (D`,k-Matrix Diffie-Hellman Assumption D`,k-MDDH). Let D`,k be a
matrix distribution. Let G = 〈g〉 be a cyclic group of prime order q. We say that the D`,k-
Matrix Diffie-Hellman (D`,k-MDDH) assumption holds in G if, for any ppt distinguisher A,
we have
AdvmddhD`,k (A) := |Pr[A(G, g
A, gA·w) = 1 | A←↩ U(D`,k), w←↩ U(Zkq)]
− Pr[A(G, gA, gu) = 1 | A←↩ U(D`,k), u←↩ U(Z`q)]| ∈ negl(λ).
It is easy to see (see, e.g., [47]) that the above assumption implies the Q-fold D`,k-Matrix
Diffie-Hellman Assumption.
Definition 15. Let D`,k be a matrix distribution and let G = 〈g〉 be a cyclic group of prime
order q. The Q-fold D`,k-Matrix Diffie-Hellman assumption holds in G says that, for any
ppt distinguisher A, we have
AdvmddhD`,k (A) := |Pr[A(G, g
A, gA·W) = 1 | A←↩ U(D`,k), W←↩ U(Zk×Qq )]
− Pr[A(G, gA, gU) = 1 | A←↩ U(D`,k), U←↩ U(Z`×Qq )]| ∈ negl(λ).
As in [45], we use a distribution Dn,k = Un,k, which outputs uniformly random matri-
ces A ←↩ U(Zn×kq ), where n denotes the input length. We rely on an n-fold Un,k-MDDH
assumption saying that the distributions
D0 := {g, gA, gA·W | A←↩ U(Zn×kq ),W←↩ U(Zk×nq )}
D1 := {g, gA, gU | A←↩ U(Zn×kq ),U←↩ U(Zn×nq )}
are computationally indistinguishable. Naor and Segev [72] showed that this assumption is
implied by the k-linear assumption [23] in G, which is the infeasibility of distinguishing the
distributions
D0 := {(g, g1, . . . , gk, ga11 , . . . , g
ak
k , g
∑k
i=1 ai) | g1, . . . , gk ←↩ U(G), a1, . . . , ak ←↩ U(Zq)},
D1 := {(g, g1, . . . , gk, ga11 , . . . , g
ak
k , g
b) | g1, . . . , gk ←↩ U(G), a1, . . . , ak, b←↩ U(Zq)}
and which boils down to the DDH assumption for k = 1.
50
E.1 Lossy Trapdoor Functions from Matrix Diffie-Hellman Assumptions
We describe a natural variant of a DDH-like LTF suggested by Freeman et al. [45, Section
6]. The main difference between the construction below and the one of [45, Section 6] is
the domain of the function family. While inputs consist of n-bit strings in [45], we use
small-norm integer vectors sampled from a discrete Gaussian distribution: namely, we define
DomDλ = {x ∈ Zn | ‖x‖ ≤ σ
√
n} and DomEλ = {x ∈ Zn | ‖x‖ ≤ γ · σ
√
n}, for some standard
deviation σ > 0 and some parameter.
For k = 1, Peikert and Waters [76] previously suggested to use small-norm integer (rather
than binary) vectors to improve the efficiency of their DDH-based LTF. We further constrain
them to have discrete Gaussian entries in order to efficiently open lossy ciphertexts in the
resulting lossy encryption scheme.
Injective Key generation. LTF.IGen(1λ) chooses a random A ←↩ U(Zn×nq ), which is Zq-
invertible w.h.p. (the process is repeated until an invertible matrix is found). It outputs
the evaluation key ek := gA ∈ Gn×n while the inversion key is ik := A−1 ∈ Zn×nq .
Lossy Key generation. LTF.LGen(1λ) chooses random matrices Ā ←↩ U(Zn×kq ), W ←↩
U(Zk×nq ) and defines A = Ā ·W ∈ Zn×nq . It outputs ek := gA ∈ Zn×nq and ik :=⊥.
Evaluation. LTF.Eval(ek,x) takes as input x ∈ DomEλ , which is mapped to the output
Y = gA·x ∈ Gn.
Inversion. LTF.Invert(ik,Y) (with Y = gy ∈ Gn for some y ∈ Znq ) uses the trapdoor
ik := A−1 ∈ Zn×nq to compute
X = YA
−1
= gA
−1·y ∈ Gn
From X ∈ Gn, compute x ∈ DomDλ such that X = gx. If no such vector is found, output
⊥. Otherwise, output x.
It is easy to see that, in lossy mode, the output is completely determined by W · x, so
that the function has image size smaller than k · log q. The proof of the following Lemma is
completely similar to that of [45, Lemma 6.3] and omitted.
Lemma 19. Under the n-fold Un,k-MDDH assumption, the above function is an entropic
lossy trapdoor function for which
H∞(x | gA, gA·x) = H∞(x | gA, gW·x) ≥ H∞(x)− k · log q.
Since a vector x sampled from the distribution DZn,γ has at least n bits of min-entropy, we
have H∞(x | gA, gA·x) ≥ n− k · log q.
E.2 A Lossy Encryption Scheme with Efficient Opening from Matrix
Diffie-Hellman Assumptions
For k = 1, the scheme coincides with the one of Bellare and Yilek [17, Section 5.2] instantiated
with a specific universal hash functions, except that we modify the space of random coins.
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Par-Gen(1λ): Choose a cyclic group G of prime order q > 2λ with g ←↩ U(G). The public
parameters Γ = {G, g, `0, q,UH, σ} specify the message space MsgSp := Z`0q , a universal
hash function family UH and an integer γ > 0.
Keygen(Γ ): Let ΠLTF = (IGen, LGen,Eval, Invert) be an instance of the LTF family recalled
in Section E.1. Let DomDλ = {x ∈ Zn | ‖x‖ ≤ σ
√
n} be the inversion domain of the
function. The public key is generated via the following steps.
1. Generate a pair (ek, ik)← ΠLTF.IGen(1λ) for an injective function of the LTF family
ΠLTF.
2. Choose the key of a function h : Domλ → Z`0q from the universal hash family, which
consists of a random matrix HUH ←↩ U(Z`0×nq ).
Output (PK, SK), where PK :=
(
ek = gA,HUH
)
and the underlying private key is
SK := ik = A−1 ∈ Zn×nq .
Encrypt(PK,Msg): To encrypt Msg ∈ Z`0q , do the following.
1. Choose x←↩ DZn,σ and compute Y = ΠLTF.Eval(ek,x) = gA·x.
2. Compute c0 = Msg + HUH · x ∈ Z`0q .
Output the ciphertext C = (Y, c0).
Decrypt(SK,C): To decrypt C = (Y, c0) using SK = ik, do the following.
1. Compute x = ΠLTF.Invert(ik,Y) and return ⊥ if x 6∈ DomDλ .
2. Return Msg = c0 −HUH · x ∈ Z`0q .
We now present the lossy key generation algorithm and the efficient opening procedure.
We require that n > 2(k + `0) · dlog qe so that the matrix W ∈ Zk×nq of the lossy mode can
be generated with a Micciancio-Peikert trapdoor.
Keygen(Γ, loss): Choose a random matrix Ā ←↩ U(Zn×kq ). In order to generate W ∈ Zk×nq ,
conduct the following steps.
1. Choose C0 ←↩ U
(
Zn̄×¯̀q
)
, where ¯̀= k + `0 and n̄ = n− ¯̀· dlog qe which is used to run
the (C,Rsim) ← GenTrap(C0, I¯̀, σ) algorithm of Lemma 8 to produce a statistically
uniform matrix of the form
C> =
[
C0
−Rsim ·C0 + Gsim
]
∈ Zn×¯̀q ,
where Gsim ∈ Z
¯̀·dlog qe×¯̀
q is the gadget matrix of [69] and a small-norm matrix Rsim ∈
Z¯̀·dlog qe×n̄. Then, parse C ∈ Z¯̀×nq as
C =
[
W
HUH
]
∈ Z¯̀×nq ,
where W ∈ Zk×nq and HUH ∈ Z`0×nq .
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2. Define A = Ā ·W ∈ Zn×nq and compute ek := gA ∈ Gn×n.
Return PKloss = (ek,HUH) and SKloss =
(
Rsim,C0, Ā
)
.
Opener(Γ, PKloss, SKloss,Msg0,x,Msg1): Given x ∈ DomEλ , parse the lossy secret key SKloss
as
(
Rsim,C0, Ā
)
and do the following.
1. Compute cLTF,x = W · x ∈ Zkq and cx = (Msg0 −Msg1) + HUH · x. Define
tx =
[
c>LTF,x | c>x
]> ∈ Z¯̀q.
2. Using the trapdoor Rsim ∈ Z
¯̀·dlog qe×n̄, sample a small-norm vector x′ ←↩ DΛtxq (C),σ so
as to have a short x′ ∈ Zn such that[
W
HUH
]
· x′ = tx mod q.
If x′ ∈ DomDλ , output x′. Otherwise, repeat Step 2 until a suitable x′ is found.
It is easy to see that, as long as Opener finds a suitable x′ at Step 2, this vector satisfies
Encrypt(PKloss,Msg1,x
′) = Encrypt(PKloss,Msg0,x). Moreover, the obtained vector x
′ has
the required distribution since, by [48][Lemma 5.2], {C ·x | x←↩ DZn,σ} is statistically close
to the uniform distribution over Z¯̀q and the two distributions
{(x′,C · x′) | x′ ←↩ DZn,σ} , {(x′,C · x′) | tx ←↩ U(Z
¯̀
q),x
′ ←↩ DΛtxq (C),σ}
are statistically indistinguishable.
The above scheme thus provides an alternative construction with SIM-SO-CPA security
under Matrix Diffie-Hellman assumptions. Solutions based on similar DDH-like assumptions
were previously reported in [17, 12, 62]. The schemes of [62] feature short ciphertexts, but
incur O(|Msg|2) exponentiations to encrypt messages of bitlength |Msg|. In comparison, our
ciphertexts require n > 2(k+`0) ·dlog qe (which amounts to 2|Msg| for k = 1) group elements
and each encryption costs O(log σ · |Msg|2) group operations.
While less efficient than the bit-wise DDH-based scheme of [17, Section 5.4] in terms of key
sizes and computational overhead, we believe the above construction to be of interest. First,
it shows that lattice trapdoors can come in handy to obtain simulation-based SOA security
from traditional number-theoretic tools (i.e., which do not rely on lattice assumptions).
Moreover, combining the above system with suitable pairing-based ABM-LTFs could open
the way to new realizations providing SIM-SO-CCA security under discrete-logarithm-related
assumptions.
F Tighter Security Proof for the BLMR PRF
This section shows that the key-homomorphic PRF of Boneh et al. [25] enjoys a tighter
security proof than previously known, under the same assumption as in [25]. By “tighter,”
we mean that the upper bound (19) on the adversary’s advantage does not depend on the
number of adversarial queries, except in a statistically negligible term.
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Definition 16 ([25]). Let λ be a security parameter and let integers k = k(λ), m = m(λ),
q = q(λ). Let χ = χ(λ) and η = η(λ) be distributions over Zq. The Non-Uniform Learning-
With-Errors (NLWEk,m,q,χ,η) assumption posits that
AdvA,NLWEk,m,q,χ,η(λ) :=
∣∣Pr[A(1λ,A,u) = 1 | A←↩ ηm×k,u←↩ U(Zmq )]
− Pr[A(1λ,A,A · s + e) = 1 | A←↩ ηm×k, s←↩ U(Zkq), e←↩ χm]
∣∣
is a negligible function for any ppt algorithm A.
Boneh et al. [25] gave an advantage-preserving reduction from LWE to NLWE for several
distributions η, called “coset-samplable,” which include the binary uniform distribution
ηbin(k) = U({0, 1}). For this specific distribution, they showed that solving NLWE in di-
mension k = ndlog qe is as hard as solving LWE in dimension n for the same modulus q
(assuming that 2dlog qe/q − 1 is negligible, i.e., that q is close to a power of 2).10
The BLMR PRF. For any x ∈ Zq, let bxcp := b(p/q) ·xc ∈ Zp, the notation being extended
to vectors in the obvious way. Boneh et al. [25] showed that, under the NLWE assumption,
one can construct a PRF F : Zmq × {0, 1}κ → Zmp keyed by a uniformly random vector
k ←↩ U(Zmq ), where m = ndlog qe, which maps a κ-bit input x = x[1] . . .x[κ] ∈ {0, 1}κ to
the output
F (k,x) =
⌊
κ∏
i=1
Ax[i] · k
⌋
p
, (18)
for distinct moduli p, q such that p|q and A0,A1 ∈ {0, 1}m×m are random Zq-invertible
binary public matrices.
One advantage of this construction is that the matrices A0,A1 may be public. When
the input x is fixed, a pre-processing phase allows hard-coding the product
∏κ
i=1 Ax[i] into
an NC1 circuit to be evaluated on an encrypted key k (note that the rounding step can be
computed in constant depth).
Boneh et al. [25] proved the security of the above PRF family under the NLWE assump-
tion via a reduction that loses a factor Q between the advantage of the pseudorandomness
adversary and the distinguishing advantage against the problem of Definition 16. Indeed, the
proof of [25, Claim 5.4] uses an NLWE instance with Q secrets, where Q is the number of
PRF evaluation queries. Analogously to LWE, the only known reductions from NLWE to its
multi-secret variants (where the secret S is a k ×Q matrix) proceed via a hybrid argument
over the columns of S ∈ Zk×Qq , implying a multiplicative gap Ω(Q) in terms of concrete
security.
In order to give a tighter reduction here, we need a variant of the Leftover Hash Lemma
due to Dodis et al. [40], which is stated as in [1]
10 Note that for inputs of length k, our modulus q will be required to be of magnitude 2Ω(k). We may choose a q that
satisfies 2dlog qe/q − 1 ≤ 2−Ω(k).
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Lemma 20. Let H = {h : X → Y }h∈H be a family of universal hash functions and f : X →
Z be a function, for countable sets X, Y, Z. For any random variable T taking values in X:
∆
(
(h, h(T ), f(T )), (h, U(Y ), f(T ))
)
≤ 1
2
·
√
2−H∞(T ) · |Y | · |Z|.
More generally, let (Ti)i≤k be independent random variables taking values in X. In this case,
we have:
∆
(
(h, (h(Ti), f(Ti))i≤k), (h, (U(Y ))
(i), f(Ti))i≤k))
)
≤ k
2
·
√
2−H∞(T ) · |Y | · |Z|.
In the following, for any x = x[1] . . .x[κ] ∈ {0, 1}κ and any index j ≤ κ, we let
x|j ∈ {0, 1}κ−j+1 denote the sub-string comprised of the bits x[j], . . . ,x[κ] of x.
As in the parameter choice recommended in [25], we may set κ = nε/ log n, p = 2n
ε−ω(logn)
and choose χ = Dαq with rejection of samples of magnitude ≥ B = αq
√
λ, for some α = 2−n
ε
with 0 < ε < 1.
Theorem 7. Assume that q is odd. If α ≤ 1/(4(m log q+λ)
√
λq) and α·(2m)κ ·p ≤ 2−ω(logn),
the BLMR PRF is secure under the NLWE assumption. Specifically, the advantage of any
PRF distinguisher making at most Q queries is smaller than
AdvD,prfQ (λ)≤ 2 · (m log q + λ) · (κ+ 1) ·Adv
D,nlwe
m,2m,q,χ,η(λ) (19)
+2κ+3 · (κ+ 1) ·mκ · α · p · (m log q + λ) + Q · (κ+ 1)
2λ−1
.
Proof. To prove the result we consider a sequence of games. For each j, we call Wj the event
that the adversary A outputs 1 in Game j for each j ∈ {0, . . . , κ + 1}. For convenience, we
first describe Game κ+ 1 which corresponds to the adversary interacting with the real PRF.
Game κ+ 1: In this game, the adversary interacts with the real function as defined by (18).
Game j (0 ≤ j ≤ κ): In this game, the adversary interacts with a “hybrid” function which,
for each query x ∈ {0, 1}κ, consists of a rounded product of
F (j)(x) =
⌊
j−1∏
i=1
Ax[i] · kx|j
⌋
p
,
where kx|j = R(x|j) ∈ Zmq , for a truly uniform function R : {0, 1}κ−j+1 → Zmq . The
function R : {0, 1}κ−j+1 → Zmq can be lazily defined by choosing random outputs in Zmq
as A makes queries and bookkeeping the queries and answers.
Note that, in Game 0, the adversary interacts with a truly random function
Rp : {0, 1}κ→ Zmp
x → F (0)(x) = bR(x)cp,
since p|q and R : {0, 1}κ → Zmq is itself truly random.
To prove the result, we show that, for each j ∈ {0, . . . , κ}, Game j is computationally
indistinguishable from Game j + 1. To this end, we define a modification of Game j.
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Game j.0 (1 ≤ j ≤ κ): In this game, we modify the way the adversary computes the hybrid
function for each query x ∈ {0, 1}κ. Before starting its interaction with the adversary,
the challenger picks a uniformly random matrix B←↩ U
(
Z2m×(2m log q+2λ)q
)
. At each query
x ∈ {0, 1}κ, the challenger looks up a list L (which is initially empty) and checks if it
contains an entry (x|j+1, tx|j) for some vector tx|j ∈ Z2mq . If so, it parses tx|j as in (20)
and uses it to compute F (j)(x) as in (21). If no such entry is in L, the challenger samples
rx|j+1 ←↩ U({−1, 1}2m log q+2λ), computes tx|j = B · rx|j+1 ∈ Z2mq , which it parses as
tx|j =
[
k0||x|j+1
k1||x|j+1
]
, (20)
where k0||x|j+1 ,k1||x|j+1 ∈ Zmq . Then, it stores (x|j+1, tx|j) in the list L and computes
F (j)(x) =
⌊
j−1∏
i=1
Ax[i] · kx[j]||x|j+1
⌋
p
. (21)
We remark that, since B is uniformly distributed over Z2m×(2m log q+2λ)q , the distribution of
the vector tx|j = B · rx|j+1 is statistically close to the distribution U(Z2mq ) by the Leftover
Hash Lemma.11 By taking a union bound over the number Q of evaluation queries, we obtain
the inequality |Pr[Wj]− Pr[Wj.0]| ≤ Q · 2−λ.
Game j.1 (1 ≤ j ≤ κ): This game is identical to Game j.0 except that we replace the uni-
formly random matrix B by a matrix of the form
B = A · S + E ∈ Z2m×(2m log q+2λ)q ,
where A =
[
A0
A1
]
, S←↩ U
(
Zm×(2m log q+2λ)q
)
and E←↩ χ2m×(2m log q+2λ).
Under the NLWE assumption, Game j.1 is indistinguishable from Game j.0: there exists an
NLWE distinguisher such that |Pr[Wj.0]− Pr[Wj.1]| ≤ (2m log q + 2λ) ·AdvD,nlwem,2m,q,χ,η(λ). We
remark that in Game j.1, the vector tx|j of (20) is of the form
tx|j =
[
k0||x|j+1
k1||x|j+1
]
=
[
A0 · S · rx|j+1 + E0 · rx|j+1
A1 · S · rx|j+1 + E1 · rx|j+1
]
(22)
where E =
[
E0
E1
]
←↩ χ2m×(2m log q+2λ).
Game j.2 (1 ≤ j ≤ κ): We change the distribution of the vectors tx|j of (22) which, for each
query x ∈ {0, 1}κ, are now computed as
tx|j =
[
A0 · k′x|j+1 + E0 · rx|j+1
A1 · k′x|j+1 + E1 · rx|j+1
]
(23)
11 Note that the assumption that q is odd guarantees that we have a family of universal hash functions.
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for some uniformly random vector k′x|j+1 ←↩ U(Zmq ) which is a random function of the
last κ − j bits x[j + 1], . . . ,x[κ] of x (i.e., if these bits are the same, the output is the
same, independently of the first j bits)).
We observe that Game j.2 is statistically close to Game j.1 by Lemma 20. We know that
each entry of E · rx|j+1 ∈ Z2m is bounded by 2B(2m log q + 2λ) in magnitude. The partial
information E · rx|j+1 ∈ Z2m about rx|j+1 thus lives in a set of size (4B(m log q + λ))2m.
If rx|j+1 is sampled from U({−1, 1}2m log q+2λ), conditionally on E · rx|j+1 , the distribution
of S · rx|j+1 ∈ Zmq is within statistical distance
1
2
·
√
(4B(m log q + λ))2m · qm
q2m · 22λ
=
1
2
·
(4B(m log q + λ)
q1/2
)m
· 1
2λ
< 2−λ
from the distribution U(Zmq ). This is because B = αq
√
λ ≤ √q/(4(m log q+λ)), by assump-
tion on α. Taking a union bound over all queries, we obtain |Pr[Wj.2]− Pr[Wj.1]| ≤ Q · 2−λ.
Game j.3 (1 ≤ j ≤ κ): In this game, we change again the distribution of the vectors tx|j of
(23) and remove the terms E0 · rx|j+1 and E1 · rx|j+1 from the right-hand-side member of
(23). The vectors tx|j of (23) are thus changed into
tx|j =
[
A0 · k′x|j+1
A1 · k′x|j+1
]
. (24)
We show that, except with negligible probability, this modification has no impact on A’s view
since it does not affect the rounding operation in (21). In other words, with overwhelming
probability, the vector tx|j of (24) leads to the same value of F
(j)(x) as the one of (23).
To see this, let us call badj.3 the event that Game j.3 deviates from Game j.2. To bound
Pr[badj.3], we first note that, since χ is a B-bounded distribution, each entry of E0 · rx|j+1
and E1 · rx|j+1 is smaller than 4B(m log q + λ) in magnitude. If we define
wb,x =
j−1∏
i=1
Ax[i] · (Eb · rx|j+1) ∈ Zm
for b ∈ {0, 1}, we have ‖wb,x‖ ≤ Bmax = 4mκ−1
√
mB(m log q + λ). Defining
yx =
j∏
i=1
Ax[i] · k′x|j+1 , (25)
we see that badj.3 happens when byx + wx[j],xcp 6= byxcp, which implies that at least one of
the coordinates of yx is within distance Bmax from the nearest multiple of q/p. For a given
query x, we call this event badx,j.3.
For a given query x, we know that k′x|j+1 is uniformly distributed over Z
m
q . Since A0,A1 ∈
{0, 1}m×m are Zq-invertible, so is any multi-product of these matrices and the vector yx of
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(25) is thus uniformly distributed over Zmq . The probability that any given coordinate of yx
lands within distance Bmax from a multiple of q/p is at most 8m
κ−1√mB(m log q+λ) · (p/q).
A union bound over the m coordinates yields the inequality
Pr[badx,j.3] ≤ 8mκ
√
mB(m log q + λ) · p
q
.
Taking a union bound over the number Q < 2κ of queries, we get
|Pr[Wj.3]− Pr[Wj.2]| ≤ Pr[badj.3]
≤ 2κ+3 ·mκ
√
mB(m log q + λ) · p
q
.
Now, we observe that Game j.3 is identical to Game j + 1 as the hybrid function that A
interacts with can be written
F (x) =
⌊
j∏
i=1
Ax[i] · k′x|j+1
⌋
p
.
Hence, Pr[Wj.3] = Pr[Wj+1].
When putting the above altogether, the triangle inequality implies the claimed upper
bound (19) for the distance |Pr[W0]− Pr[Wκ+1]|. ut
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